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Abstract 
An Examination of the Long-run Market Reaction to the  Announcement 
of Dividend Omissions and Reductions 
Yi Liu 
Samuel H. Szewczyk, Supervisor, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
This study investigates the long-run stock performance following dividend 
omissions and reductions, and looks for answers for three questions: 1) Does the market 
underreact to announcement of dividend omissions and reductions? 2) if the market does, 
how long does it take for the market to correct this underreaction, and 3) are there any 
factors  that influence the long-run underperformance? 
 We document significantly negative long-run abnormal stock returns for up to 
five years after announcement by using either holding period matching approach or 
Fama-French calendar time portfolio regression. The results are robust across time 
periods and methodologies. However, we find the horizon of long-run post-
announcement abnormal returns might be overstated in prior literature. When looking at 
each year individually, we find the abnormal performance is confined in the first 
postannouncement year. The long-run postannouncement abnormal returns beyond the 
first year reflect the compounding effects for buy-and-hold methodology and averaging 
effects for Fama-French calendar time regression. Our findings provide empirical support 
for the argument presented by Fama (1998) that the horizon of long-run anomaly is 
severely overstated. We find several factors that influence short-term market reaction to 
announcement of dividend omissions and reductions. However, most of these factors 
have no impact on the long-run abnormal stock performance. The magnitude of 
  
x
underreaction is not associated with percentage of dividend changes, reason for dividend 
changes,  dividend yield or  firm risk changes around announcement. 
Our paper also makes an important contribution in methodology: We caution 
future researchers of long-run abnormal stock performance to be aware of the fact that 
both buy-and-hold matching methodology and Fama-French calendar time portfolio 
regression tend to overstate the magnitude and horizon of long-run abnormal 
performance.  
This paper contributes to the on-going debates about the validity of Efficient 
Market Hypothesis.  
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Chapter 1: Literature review 
1.1 Introduction 
There is a growing field of  literature documenting long-run abnormal returns 
(LRARs) following major corporate events. Taken at face value, these findings strongly 
suggest market inefficiency. However, Fama (1998) argues that this emerging evidence is 
often the result of chance and/or can be attributed to misspecification of methodology. 
More specifically, on the long-run anomaly following dividend initiations and omissions 
documented by Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) in their 1964-1988 sampling 
period, Fama suggests that changing  the authors matching criteria might tell a different 
story. He calls  for an out-ofsample test before drawing any  inferences about long-term 
returns following changes in dividends. 
  This paper uses 1326 announcements of dividend omissions and reductions 
made over the period from 1963 through 1995 to address Fama (1998)s critique on 
literature documenting long-run anomaly following dividend changes. There are several 
reasons to believe that dividend omissions and reductions offer a good laboratory to 
investigate long-run anomalies following major corporate events. First, the cumulative 
empirical evidence indicates that dividend cuts and omissions capture significant 
information concerning the announcing firms financial condition. For instance, 
Christie(1994) reports two-day abnormal returns at announcements of dividend 
reductions and omissions of 6.78 and 6.94 percent, respectively. Our short-run study 
following dividend omissions and reductions reveals similar results. Therefore, even a 
modest bias in the markets reaction (overreaction or underreaction) could lead to 
significant post-announcement price drifts. Second, compared with clustered studies on 
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long-run market reaction following IPOs or SEOs, very few papers (Michaely et al, 1995;  
Benartzi et al.,1997; Boehme and Sorescu, 2002)  investigate market long-run reaction 
following dividend changes and their results are not conclusive .  
This paper provides  conclusions to the following questions: 1) Does market 
underreact to announcement of dividend omissions and reductions? 2) if market does, 
how long does it take for market to correct this underreaction and  3) are there any factors 
that influence the long-run underperformance? 
   This paper contributes to existing literature in the following ways: First, we 
document significantly negative long-run abnormal stock returns performance following  
the announcement of dividend omissions and reductions by using either buy-and-hold 
matching approach or Fama-French calendar time portfolio regressions. The results are 
not sensitive to different methodologies and supports the notion that the market 
underreacts to firm-specific news. This finding is an answer to Fama (1998)s critique 
that long-run studies following dividend changes may be subject to different matching 
methodologies. Second, we find the abnormal performance is confined in the first 
postannouncement year. The long-run post-announcement abnormal returns beyond the 
first year reflect the compounding effects for buy-and-hold methodology and the 
averaging effects for Fama-French calendar time regression. 
Our paper also makes important contributions in methodology: we caution future 
researchers of long-run anomaly to be aware of the fact that both buy-and-hold matching 
methodology and Fama-French calendar time portfolio regression tend to overstate the 
magnitude and horizon of long-run abnormal performance. We also employ various 
matching criteria that might be related to the cross-sectional difference of expected 
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returns. The seven matching criteria used in this paper capture important risk factors 
known in  finance literature. It is also the first time that leverage is used as one matching 
criteria in the long-run study.  
   The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 1 reviews the 
literature on long-run anomaly and dividend policy. Chapter 2 reviews methodologies 
and describes our methodology. Chapter 3 describes the event-sample and matching 
samples. Chapter 4 examines long-run post-event abnormal returns.  Chapter 5 
investigates the determinants of long-run abnormal returns.  
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1.2 Literature on dividend policy 
Although this dissertation focuses on the long-run post-announcement stock 
performance following dividend changes, a thorough review of  relevant dividend 
literature helps us to understand the significance and contribution of this paper. Both 
theoretical and empirical researches in dividends are struggling to answer so called          
 Dividend Puzzle expressed in Black (1976). Black asks  Why do corporations pay 
dividends? and  Why do investors pay attention to dividends?  The answer to the 
puzzle varies: 
1.2.1 Irrelevance of dividend policy 
In their seminar paper, Miller and Modigliani (1961) first present the  argument 
that dividend policy is irrelevant to the value of a firm if some well-defined conditions 
are met. These conditions require a perfect world where there are no differential tax rates 
between capital gain and dividends, no information asymmetries between insiders and 
outsiders, no conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, and no  transaction 
costs or  flotation costs. They also require that investors are rational. 
Their core idea is that investment decisions are independent of finance policy. In a 
perfect capital market, a firm can pay any level of dividends it likes without affecting its 
investment decisions and firm value. If paying dividends influences the companys ability 
to fund positive NPV investments, the company can simply get external funds from 
capital market. The firms dividend payout ratio need not influence its investment 
decisions. 
 
 
  
5
 
1.2.2 Information related explanation 
However, leaving M&M world, we see that companies pay dividends and 
investors pay attention to dividends. Several theories thus arise to resolve this puzzle. 
One of the most promising theories  is signaling hypothesis by Miller and Rock 
(1985). It is the first theory illustrating that dividends and external financing are merely 
two sides of the same coin. The dividend surprise conveys the same information as 
earning surprise. Managers are using the increase of dividends to signal that the firm is 
undervalued, and because firms performing poorly can not mimic the signaling due to 
their inability to sustain increased dividends, the signaling is credible. The empirical 
implication is that firms announcing dividend initiations and increases should experience 
positive announcement abnormal returns while firms cutting or reducing dividends suffer 
negative abnormal returns. It also predicts that the larger the dividend changes, the more 
pronounced the announcement-abnormal return would be. Most empirical studies support 
signaling hypothesis by finding  the sign of   announcement abnormal return are in the 
direction as dividend changes. However, the relationship between the magnitude of 
dividend change and magnitude of market reaction is mixed. Christie (1994) finds that 
the relationship between the percentage of dividend cut and market reaction is not 
monotonic. He finds that prices fall an average of 4.95 percent for reductions less than 
20 percent, and reductions exceed 60 percent induce an average of 8.78 price drop. 
However, for omissions, or in other words, reductions that equals 100 percent, the 
average price drop is only 6.94 percent. Although dividend omissions trigger substantial 
declines in stock price, these losses are significantly smaller than would be predicted 
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based on the relationship between percentage of dividend cuts and announcement market 
reaction estimated across reductions of less than 100 percent. His results suggest that 
neither signaling hypothesis nor agency cost hypothesis fully explain the information 
conveyed by dividend omissions. 
1.2.3 Agency cost based explanation 
Agency problem arises when managers and shareholders have different objective 
functions. Rozeff (1982) suggests that the optimal dividend payout is a trade off between 
flotation costs and benefits of reduced agency costs. Flotation costs arise when firms need 
to raise capital by external financing while agency cost is due to the interests conflicts 
between shareholders and managers. Shareholders are concerned that managers may 
misuse the corporations resources for personal needs by means of more perquisites or 
shirking. By paying out dividends, on one hand, there is increased need for more costly 
external financing. On the other hand, raising money from the capital market will subject 
mangers to greater monitoring by outsides. Thus, an optimal dividend payout ratio will be 
the point where marginal flotation cost equals marginal benefits from reduced agency 
costs. Similarly, Jensen (1986) free-cash flow hypothesis suggests that free cash flow 
may be used by firms to invest in negative NPV projects. Increasing dividends by a firm 
with this over-investment  problem will reduce the cash that would otherwise by wasted 
in negative NPV projects. Similarly, reducing dividends by such firms will increase  the 
probability that more negative NPV projects will be undertaken. Market considers 
increasing dividends as value-adding and decreasing dividends as reducing the value of a 
firm.  
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The implication for agency problem based explanation is that investors reaction 
to dividend changes should also be associated with  the firms profitability of future 
investment. Empirical results for free cash flow hypothesis are mixed.  Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989) try to distinguish between signaling and free cash flow hypothesis. 
They use Tobins Q as a proxy for the profitability of future investment. Firms with Q 
higher than one are over-investors. They find that the market has greater reaction to low 
Q firms around announcement of dividend changes. Several researchers (e.g. Agrawal,  
Rozeff) provide empirical support for these agency explanations for paying dividends. 
Other studies provide little or no support for the free cash flow hypothesis (e.g., Denis, 
Howe). 
1.2.4 Behavioral finance and dividend policy 
So far, all the theories are based on the assumption that investors are rational. 
Releasing this assumption, however,  helps to explain the dividend puzzle and gives 
space to behavioral  finance in dividend literature. The tools of behavioral finance 
includes frame, aversion to regression, imperfect self-control and habit. 
Frame is brought up by Shefrin and Statman (1984). They argue that generating 
cash from sales of stock is different from receiving cash dividends. Older people, for 
example, may prefer stocks having high dividend payout ratios because they rely on a 
high and stable dividends to finance their daily consumptions while keeping  their 
principals untouched. To some investors, one dollar in the stock market is not a perfect 
substitute to one dollar in cash dividend because they frame principals and dividends into 
to mental-accounts. Shefrin and Statman also find empirical evidence to support the 
frame theory.   
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Habit tells another story. Waller (1989) suggests that the existence of habitual 
behavior poses a problem when modeling dividends assuming rationality. Firms may pay 
dividends just because they used to, or just because other firms do. Fama and French 
(2001) document a substantial decline in the percentage of firms paying dividends as well 
as shrinking dividend yields across time. Habits might be a potential explanation: When 
economical, cultural and societal factors move towards paying less to dividends, fewer 
firms choose to pay dividends and firms choose to pay less dividends. 
1.2.5 Other explanations 
The different tax treatment of dividend and capital gain is also used to explain the  
dividend puzzle. Investors who receive favorable tax treatment on capital gain may prefer 
stocks with low or zero dividend payouts.  
Brennan (1970)developed a version of the capital asset pricing model which takes 
into account the effect of differential tax rates on capital gains and dividends. His version 
of CAPM not only includes systematic risk, but also incorporates an extra term that 
causes the expected return also dependent on dividend yield. His empirical results 
concerning the model, however, are mixed.  
Elton and Gruber (1970) attempt to test clientele effects by investigating the 
average price decline when a stock goes ex-dividend. They argue that favorable capital 
gains tax treatment should cause the price drop to be less than the dividend payment and 
should cause investors to prefer stocks that do not pay dividends. Using 4148 
observations between April 1, 1996 and March 31, 1967, they did find that the average 
price drop as a percentage of dividend paid was 77.7%.  
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1.2.6 The trends of  dividend payout through time 
Fama and French (2001) document a substantial decline in the percentage of firms 
paying dividends as well as dramatically shrinking dividend yields. They find that the 
proportion of firms paying cash dividends falls from 66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999. 
They also document that between 1980 and 2000, the dividend yield on the S&P 500 
companies dropped from 5.4% to 1.1%. 
They suggest the changing characteristics of publicly traded firms offers partial 
explanation to the fade dividendsthe population of publicly traded firms are fed by 
IPOs, which have a large proportion of  small firms with low profitability and strong 
growth opportunities ¯ characteristics typical of firms that have never paid dividends. 
However, even after taking the changing characteristics of publicly traded firms 
into account, the trends towards fewer firms paying dividends and lowered dividend 
yields are undeniable. Fama and French find evidence suggesting  that firms become less 
likely to pay dividends, whatever their characteristics. 
For instance, in 1978, 72.4% of firms with positive common stock earnings pay 
dividends. In 1998, the proportion shrinks to only 30.0%. The proportion of payers 
among firms with earnings in excess of investment  falls from 68.4% in 1978 to 32.4% in 
1998. Their results suggest that dividends become less likely among dividend payers 
(firms with positive earnings and earnings in excess of investment). The fading dividend 
trend is also documented for  unprofitable firms and firms with more investment 
opportunities. For firms where earnings are less than investment needs, the proportion 
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paying dividends falls from 68.6% in 1978 to 15.6% in 1998. For unprofitable firms, 
about 20% of firms with negative common stock earnings still pay dividends before 1983 
while in 1998, only 7.2% of unprofitable firms pay dividends. 
Since our data covers dividend omissions and reductions from 1963 to 1995, 
which overlaps the period that exhibits a trend towards disappearing dividends, in 
chapter 5, we investigate how this trend will influence investors reaction following 
dividend omissions and reductions, both  in the short-run and the long-run.  
1.3 Theoretical models concerning overreaction and underreaction 
   In this paper, we are interested in whether investors rationally react to the 
information carried by announcement of dividend omissions and cuts. Two hypotheses 
emerge concerning the nature of the LRARs of firms following major corporate events.  
The first, Market efficiency hypothesis (Fama,1998) rejects LRARs.  Fama argues that 
any observed can be attributed to either chance or misspecification of  methodology.  
The second hypothesis, behavioral finance, predicts that  investors will underreact 
or overreact to corporate events. Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., (BSV, 1998) use 
representativeness  bias and conservatism, which were based on the findings in 
psychology literature, to model investors behavior.  
Conservatism states that individuals are slow to change their beliefs in the face of 
new evidence. In psychology literature, Edwards (1968) benchmarks a subjects reaction 
to new evidence against that of an idealized rational people in experiments. He shows 
that ordinary individuals update their posteriors in the right direction, but too slowly in 
the magnitude to the rational people benchmark. He also finds that  conservatism is 
actually more pronounced the more objectively useful is the new evidence. Conservatism 
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serves well in explaining underreaction following major corporate events as earning 
announcement and dividend changes. Investors subject to conservatism might disregard 
the full information of an public announcement, believing it is a  temporary phenomena, 
and still stick to, at least partially,  their prior estimation of the company. Consequently, 
they adjust their valuation of stocks only partially in response to the announcement. 
Representativeness refers to the idea that individuals evaluate the probability of 
an uncertain event, or a sample, by degree to which it is similar in its essential properties 
to the parent population, and reflects the salient features of the process by which it is 
generated. BSV (1998) illustrate representativeness in the following example: Consider if 
a detailed description of an individuals personality matches up well with the subjects 
experiences with people of a particular profession, the subject tends to significantly 
overestimate the actual probability that the given individual belongs to that profession. In 
overweighting the representative description, the subject underweights the statistical base 
rate evidence of the small fraction of the population belonging to that profession. In other 
words, people mistakenly think they find patterns in truly random sequences. As 
conservatism explains underreaction, representativeness interprets overreaction following 
a sequence of news in the same direction. When a company experiences a consistent 
earning growth over several years, investors might believe that the past history is 
representative of an underlying growth potential  pattern while the past growth is just a 
random draw for  few firms and this history is unlikely to repeat itself. 
 Representativeness predicts that investors have the tendency to overreact in some 
cases because they give too much weight to patterns in recent data, while failing to 
realize the properties of the population that generates the data. Conservatism predicts 
  
12
underreaction because investors update their expectations too slowly in the face of new 
evidence. Conservatism and representativeness, however, do not conflict. 
Representativeness predicts that investors will overreact to a series of news pointing the 
same direction. In other words, they overreact to past patterns. For instance, investors 
will overvalue a stock following a consistent period of abnormal growth. Conservatism 
suggests that individuals tend to underreact to unexpected  events like the announcement 
of dividend changes, earning changes etc. Put simply, if the news is one single, separate 
piece of news and not consistent with past patterns, individuals tend to underreact. If not 
one, but a series of news in the same direction, gradually, investors will overreact. More 
specifically, BSV(1998) models investors who believe there are two regimes governing 
earnings and the market moves between them. In regime 1,earnings are  mean-reverting; 
in regime 2,  they trend. In regime one, investors underestimate the impact of the news, 
mistakenly believing the surprise will be reverted; In regime 2, they overestimate the 
impact of a series  of news, assuming the trend will continue. They fail to see that in both 
regimes, earnings are just following random walk. If the investor  experiences an earning 
shock of the opposite sign of previous trend, he thinks he is in regime 1.  If he investor 
observes  consecutive positive news about earnings, he believes he is in regime 2. In 
regime 1, the investor  underreacts; in 2 , he overreacts. 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) present another model in which 
investors are subject to two biases: overconfidence and biased self-attribution. They 
define the overconfident investor as one who overestimates the precision of his private 
information signal, but not of information signals publicly received by all. Biased self-
attribution means that the confidence of the investor grows when public information is in 
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agreement with his private information, but the confidence does not fall when public 
information contradicts his private information. In other words, people tend to credit 
themselves for past success, and blame external factors for failure. 
Overconfidence leads investors to  over-weight  private information and self-
attribution leads them under-weight public signals when these signals contradict their 
private information. Based on these biases, their theory shows that positive return 
autocorrelations can be a result of continuing overreaction due to overconfidence. 
However, the overreaction will be followed by long-run correction when public 
information is eventually proven to be true. Thus, their models predicts short-term 
continuation of stock returns but long-term reversals. This model also predicts that 
investors will underreact to major corporate events like SEOs, mergers and share 
repurchasing, which occur to take advantage of the mispricing of a firms stock. Due to 
overconfidence of their private information, investors underreact to the corporate events 
which are signals to correct the  misevaluation of the stock. The underreaction will be 
corrected in the long-run when the correct information carried by the event 
announcement eventually overwhelms the market and we observe the price drift as the 
same sign of announcement price drift. 
The behavioral  models advocated by Both Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 
(1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), although different on the 
behavioral biases they propose, both predict that investors will underreact to major 
corporate events. In the next section, we review whether empirical evidence is consistent 
with these behavioral models. 
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1.4 Review of empirical evidence on overreaction and underreaction 
Although literature documents both overreaction and underreaction, and Fama 
(1998) thus argues that these inefficiencies are just random phenomena, we find these 
empirical evidences are more consistent with  BSV (1998)s behavioral model. Before 
discussing these evidence, we first define overreaction and underreaction following   
BSV (1998). Suppose that in each time period, the investor hears news about a particular 
company. We denote the news he hears in period t as zt. This news can be either good or 
bad, i.e., zt=G or zt=B. If there is no news, we denote it as zt=0 
By underreaction we mean that the average return on the company's stock in the 
period following an announcement of good(bad) news is higher(lower)  than its expected 
return in the same period without that news: 
E(rt+1|zt=G)>E(rt+1|zt=o). 
Or E(rt+1|zt=B)<E(rt+1|zt=o). 
In other words, the stock underreacts to the good (bad) news, a mistake which is 
corrected in the following period, giving a higher (lower)  return at that time.  
Analogous to the definition of underreaction, overreaction is defined as  occurring 
when the average return following not one but a series of announcements of good(bad)  
news is lower(higher)  than the expected return without these news. 
E(rt+1|zt=G, zt-1=G,..., zt-j=G)<E(rt+1|zt=0, zt-1=0,..., zt-j=0), 
Or: E(rt+1|zt=B, zt-1=B,..., zt-j=B)>E(rt+1|zt=0, zt-1=0,..., zt-j=0), 
The  difference between our definition and BSV (1998) is that we are not 
comparing the performance of firms with good news to firms with bad news, rather, we 
are comparing firms with good (bad) news with firms with no news. This definition is 
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more consistent with methodologies in empirical work which generally compare the 
return following a major corporate event ( bad news or good news) with the expected 
return of the stock of the firm assuming no such an event. 
1.4.1 Empirical evidence of autocorrelation of stock returns  
  The overreaction hypothesis was empirically investigated first. Debondt and 
Thaler (1985) find that portfolios of prior losers tend to outperform prior winners. 
Three years after forming the portfolio, the losing stocks have earned about 25% more 
than the winners. It implies that stock prices are systematically overshot and their reversal 
could be predicted by previous movement. Their results suggest violation of weak-form 
market efficiency. The suggested negative relationship between past returns and future 
returns over a long horizon is supported by other studies. Fama and French (1988)and  
Cutler et al. (1991)  find a negative autocorrelation over horizons of 3¯5 years. 
If prior good (bad) stock performance were associated with previous strong (poor) 
earnings, the negative autocorrelation over a long horizon may be attributed to investors 
overreaction to past operation performance of companies. Following this direction, 
subsequent studies focus on the accounting valuations and their predicting power on 
stock returns. Lakonishok et al. (1994) suggest that Firms with high ratios of  market 
value to book (M/B), market value to cash flow (M/C), price to earnings (P/E)  tend to 
have strong past earning growth, while firms with  low such  ratios tend to have poor past 
earning growth. As predicted by overreaction hypothesis, firms with high M/B, M/C and 
P/E ratios have low future stock returns while firms with low such ratios have high future 
stock returns.  
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The negative autocorrelation in the long-run (3-5 years), is replaced by the 
positive autocorrelation in the short-run. Cutler et al. (1991) also find positive 
autocorrelation in abnormal index returns over horizons of between one month and one 
year. As long-run negative autocorrelation is explained by overreaction, short-run 
autocorrelation is supported by underreaction.  
1.4.2 Empirical evidence of underreaction and  overreaction  
Researches have documented LRARs to information including IPOs, SEOs 
(Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess et al.,1995; Brav and Gompers,1997), dividend 
initiations and omissions (Michealy et al, 1995; Boehme and Sorescu, 2002), mergers 
(Asquith, 1983; Agrawal et al., 1992), stock splits (Desai and Jain,1997; Ikenberry et 
al.,1996), share repurchases (Ikenberry et al.,1995) and spin offs (Cusatis et al.,1993).  
IPOs and SEOs are the most thoroughly studied corporate events in the long-run 
study. Ritter (1991) first documented the long-run under-performance of initial public 
offerings. Issuing firms in the sample period 1975-84 substantially under-perform 
matched firms. Loughran and Ritter (1995) extends the long-run anomaly to include both 
IPO and SEO. They find the wealth generated by investing in IPOs or SEOs will be 30% 
lower than the wealth generatede by holding a matching firms stock.  
Brav and Gompers (1997) find that venture capital-backed IPOs outperform non-
venture capital-backed IPOs and only non-venture capital-backed IPOs have negative 
long run abnormal return. They conclude that the long-run underperformance of IPO 
reported by Ritter(1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) comes primarily from small, 
non-venture backed IPOs. Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) find that IPOs underwritten by 
investment banks with the highest reputation do not under-perform the NASDAQ index 
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while IPOs underwritten by less prestigious investment banks severely under-perform the 
NASDAQ index. 
Siew et al. (1998) find that seasoned equity issuers can raise reported earnings by 
altering discretionary accounting accruals. They report that  that issuers who adjust 
discretionary current accruals to report higher net income prior to the offering have lower 
post-issue long-run abnormal stock returns and net income.  They suggest that long-run 
poor performance following announcements of SEOs could be attributed to investors 
mistakenly interpreting  pre-issue earnings without fully adjusting for the potential 
manipulation of reported earnings. More specifically, unusually aggressive management 
of earnings through income-increasing accounting adjustments leads investors to be 
overly optimistic about the issuers future and investors consequently overvalue the new 
issues. When post-issue earnings declined, disappointed investors subsequently revalue 
the firm down to a level justified and the stock reveals long-run poor performance. 
Agrawal et al. (1992) study the long-run post merger performance of acquiring 
firms. They find that the stocks of acquiring firms suffer a statistically significant loss of  
about 10% over the five-year post-merger period. When dividing their sample into sub- 
periods, however, the anomaly does not hold for the 1970s, but hold for 1950s, 1960s and 
1980s. Since the underperformance in the 1980s is as severe as the underperformance in 
the 1950s and the 1960s, their results in sub-periods do not suggest markets become more 
efficient over time. The paper also subdivides the sample into conglomerate and non-
conglomerate mergers because the authors assume that conglometerate mergers are less 
likely to succeed. In contrast with popular belief, however, the underperformance of 
acquirers is worse in non-conglomerate mergers than in conglomerate mergers.  
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Ikenberry et al. (1995) study the long-run stock performance following open 
market share repurchases announcements from 1980 to 1990. Although average four-year 
abnormal return is 12.1% for the whole sample, no positive price drift is found for 
glamour stocks while the average abnormal return for value stocks is 45.3%. If  
Value stocks are more likely to be repurchased because of under-valuation, the actual 
information content of repurchasing announcement should be different between value 
stocks and glamour stocks. 
Using buy-and-hold abnormal returns matched by size and book-to-market 
portfolio benchmarks, Ikenberry et al. (1996) document significant post-split abnormal 
returns of 7.93 percent in the first year and 12.15 percent in the first three years for a 
sample of 1,275 two-for-one stock splits between 1975 and 1990.Desai and Jain (1997) 
examine 1-3 year performance of common stocks following stock splits or reverse splits 
in the period 1976-91. Using buy-and-hold abnormal returns matched by portfolio with 
similar size, book-to-market ratio and prior six month performance, they document 7.05  
percent and 11.87 percent positive abnormal return for 1- and 3- year holding periods. 
For reverse splits, the corresponding abnormal returns are 10.76 and 33.90 percent. 
Their results could be compared with Michaely et al. (1995), which also documents a 
positive price drift following dividend initiations and a negative drift for omissions 
(which could be considered as a reverse initiation). Desai and Jain (1997) and Ikenberry 
et al. (1996)s  finding, however,  contradicts early research by  Fama et al. (1969)  on 
splits during 1927-59 period, which document no cumulative abnormal returns following 
the splits. Fama(1998)  concludes that the 1975¯91 anomaly is not real.  
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Very few papers address the LRARs after announcement of dividend changes. 
Michaely et al. (1995)  find underreaction following dividend omission and initiation 
from 1964-1988. They report that announcement three-day positive reactions of 3.4 
percent to initiations and 7.0 percent to omissions are following by price drift in the 
same direction. Over the next three-year post-announcement period, initiation firms 
experience a market-adjusted excess return of 15.6 percent while omission firms have a 
market-adjusted excess return of 15.3 percent.    
      Benartzi et al. (1997) expand their interest into dividend increases and cuts. 
For the sampling period from 1979 to 1991, in the three years following dividend cuts, 
the abnormal return is only 1.4 percent and non-significant at conventional level. For 
dividend increases, the three-year abnormal return is a significant 8.0 percent. It is of 
interesting, that, in the same paper, Benartzi et al. (1997) find there is no relationship 
between dividend changes and future earning changes. More specifically, a dividend 
reduction does not lead to unexpected earning reduction in the future and dividend 
increase is not followed by future unexpected earning increases. If dividend changes are 
not associated with unexpected future earning  changes, the resource of long-run price 
drift in the same direction as the announcement price drift is mysterious. 
  Fama (1998) questions Michaelys results because the negative three-year 
abnormal returns following omissions are largely concentrated in the second half of their 
1964¯88 sample period and because abnormal return documented by Michaely et al. 
(1995)  disappears when matching criteria is altered. Fama  calls for an out-of-sample test 
before drawing any  inferences about long-term returns following changes in dividends. 
Answering the call, Boehme and Sorescu (2002) study long-term stock performance 
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following dividend initiations and resumptions from 1927 to 1998. Although they find 
that post-announcement abnormal returns are significantly positive, the abnormal 
performance is confined to the smaller firms and not robust across sub-samples. 
1.4.3 Summary on empirical evidence 
First, evidence suggests that market underreacts to most corporate event 
announcements.  Although Fama (1998) argues that overreaction and underreaction are 
split equally in literature and attribute them simply to chance, we dont agree that these 
patterns support market efficiency. Some overreactions could be attributed to  managers 
timing the announcement and manipulating financial data. IPOs,  post-listing drifting 
belongs to this group. Except these two events, underreaction dominates market behavior 
following major corporate events. SEOs, merger, dividend initiations and omissions, 
earning announcements, share repurchase, stock spits and reverse splits are in this 
catalog. Underreaction and overreaction are not split equally. 
Second, although model misspecification could be a potential explanation for 
documented under- or over- reaction, it can not explain why the same model generates 
positive abnormal return for a corporate event while producing negative price drift for a 
reverse event. In other words, it would be  difficult to explain why the  same model 
generates both positive and negative biases. These empirical evidence include: stock 
splits and reverse splits by Desai and Jain (1997) and dividend initiations and omissions 
by Michealy et al. (1995).   
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Chapter 2:  Methodology 
2.1 Methodologies review 
Researchers apply various approaches to measure the LRARs of event firms. 
Table 1 summarizes methodologies in prior literature. 
In table 1 Panel A, each row list the possible approaches to calculate expected 
returns, or in other words, the normal returns. The three columns indicate possible ways 
that researchers calculate abnormal returns for the event sample.  
2.1.1 Defining the normal return: time series vs. cross-sectional approach 
To measure the LRARs, the critical step is to define what the normal return 
should be. However, since normative asset pricing models have little corroborating 
empirical support, there is no consensus on how to define  long-term normal returns. 
Beginning with Fama et al. (1969), event studies provide a useful methodology to 
study how the market reacts to information in a short window (a few days). Although any 
market efficiency test is a joint test of the expected return model and market efficiency, 
an advantage of focusing on a short window is that because daily expected returns are 
close to zero, the model for expected returns does not have a big effect on inferences 
about abnormal returns (Fama,1998). For instance, in many short-term event studies, 
market model, market adjusted model or CAPM model do not generate significantly 
different results.  However, event studies looking at abnormal returns in a relatively long 
window (a few months or years) are not so fortunate. We classify tests of LRARs in two 
approaches: Time-series approach and cross-sectional approach. Kothari and 
Warner(1996) list three time series models including market model, CAPM model and 
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Fama-French-Three-Factor model used by previous literature. There is one common 
characteristic when applying these models: their parameters should be estimated in an 
out-of-sample period. That is why we classify  them as time series approach. The implicit 
assumption is that these parameters do not change in the sample period. When 
researchers investigate abnormal return up to five years following the event, this 
assumption is questioned. On the other hand, many researchers use a reference portfolio 
or a matching portfolio to capture the expected return. We call it cross-sectional 
approach. The advantage is that it does not need pre-event data for parameter estimation 
(Kothari and Warner (1996)). The implicit assumption is that the matching portfolio is 
similar in all characteristics that are valued in expected stock returns and this assumption 
is also the focus of critiques. Early studies measuring abnormal return as the difference of 
the return between an event firm and a market portfolio (CRSP equally-weighted index, 
for example) were criticized because the market index does not accurately measure the 
expected return of event firms. More specifically,  earlier studies using a reference 
portfolio as the benchmark are mis-specified and subject to new listing, rebalancing and 
skewness biases (Barber and Lyon, 1997). These biases cause empirical rejecting rates to 
exceed the theoretical rejecting rates. New listing  bias arises because  event firms usually 
have a long post-event return while  firms constituting  the reference portfolio usually 
include new firms that begin trading subsequent to the event month. Since these new 
listing firms are excluded from event firms sample, while included in the reference 
portfolio, the results of LRARs may be biased if new listing firms  averagely outperform 
or under-perform the market. Since much of the literature documents underperformance 
of IPOs, the LRARs may be positively biased. Rebalancing bias arises when index 
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returns are compounded assuming monthly rebalancing of all securities constituting the 
index. The reason to rebalance is to maintain the equal weight of  all securities in the 
index, which means stocks with higher return than the market in the previous month are 
sold while those below the market are bought. For instance, consider an index including 
only two stocks, A and B. If  the return for stock A is 20% while for B is 20%  in month 
t, an investor who invest 1 dollar each in A and B will cumulate 1.2 dollar in A and 0.8 
dollar in B. To maintains the same amount in both A and B , he has to sell 0.2 dollar A 
and purchase 0.2 dollar B. According to Barber and Lyon, this rebalancing will lead to 
bias for the population mean of buy-and-hold abnormal return if the consecutive monthly 
returns for individuals stocks are correlated. They show that when the one month lag 
correlation is negative, rebalancing will lead to purchase stocks that subsequently 
perform well (precious losers) and sell stocks that subsequently perform poor (previous 
winners). This strategy causes inflated return for the index and make the population mean 
of buy-and-hold abnormal return  negatively biased. It is also common that using a 
reference portfolio will lead to skewness. It is common that individual firms have an 
annual return in excess of 100%, while it is uncommon to observe a return on the market 
index in excess of 100% because reference portfolios are diversified. Because abnormal 
return is the difference between sample firm return and the market return, the abnormal 
return are positively skewed. The simulation of Barber and Lyon( 1997) shows that the 
mean buy-and-hold abnormal return is much larger than the median, indicating a positive 
skewness due to extreme positive abnormal returns. They also show that in a random 
sample of 200,000 annual buy-and-hold abnormal returns, only 42% of all firms have 
positive buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
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 To correct these biases, Barber and Lyon (1997) suggest a control firm approach 
by   matching an event firm with a non-event firm with the similar sizes and book-to-
market ratios.  However, Fama (1998) notices that matching on one criteria can produce 
much different abnormal returns than matching on another criteria, and both size and 
book-to-market ratios do not capture all relevant cross-firm variation in average returns. 
For instance, Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000) suggests that a consistent explanation to 
the equity issue puzzle is that  equity issuers have lower leverage. Although leverage 
might be a potential explanation of  the puzzle, no previous study directly matches a 
sample firm by leverage. In this paper, we use various criteria that might be associated 
with cross-sectional expected returns to address Fama(1998)s critique that LRARs is 
rarely robust to alternative methodologies. 
2.1.2 Calculating the abnormal return across time: CAR vs. BHAR 
For firm j in month t, abnormal return is simply the actual return of firm j less its 
expected return. However, in the long-run study, our interest extends to more than one 
month. The post-announcement period in prior studies ranges from 6 months to 60 
months. To examine how prices respond over periods longer than a month, two 
approaches are used in prior research.  The cumulative approach sums the abnormal 
return in each month (called CARs) , or takes the average of the monthly abnormal 
returns (AARs). The holding period returns approach compounds the monthly abnormal 
returns in each month. Fama (1998) argues that tests for abnormal returns should use the 
return metric called for by the model invoked to estimate expected (normal) returns. 
However, normative models such as CAPM does not specify which interval ( daily, 
weekly, or monthly, for instance) is correct for calculating expected returns. Fama (1998) 
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suggests three reasons to favor CARs. First, Asset price models commonly assure that 
normally distributed returns and normality is a better approximation for shorter horizons 
than longer ones. Second, most empirical tests of assets pricing models typically use 
monthly returns. There are no tests of asset pricing models on three-year or five-year 
returns. Third, the longitude of abnormal returns tend to be overstated when returns are 
compounded. Whether to use CARs or BHARs, however, as Ritter (1991)   suggested, 
depends on what research question we are interested in. Barber and Lyon( 1997) gave the 
following example of how CARs and BHARs address different problems. Consider the 
case of a 12-month CAR and an annual BHAR. Dividing the 12-month CAR by 12 yields 
a mean monthly abnormal return. Thus, a test of the null hypothesis that the 12-month 
CAR is zero is equivalent to a test of the null hypothesis that the mean monthly abnormal 
return of sample firm during the event year is equal to zero; it is not a test of the null 
hypothesis that the mean annul abnormal return is equal to zero. To test the later 
hypothesis, Barber and Lyon( 1997) suggest using buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
Because in our research, we are interested in the wealth effect experienced by an investor, 
we prefer BHAR approach. Barber and Lyon (1997) also find that cumulative abnormal 
return is a biased predictor of buy-and-hold abnormal return. Using simulations, they 
show that when the annual BHAR is less than approximately 13%, the CAR is 
approximately 5% greater than the BHAR. The difference between the CARs and 
BHARs decreases as the annual BHAR approaches 28%. As the annual BHAR increases 
beyond 28%, the CARs are dramatically less than the annual BHAR. The difference of 
BHAR and CAR is due to compounding. Consider a stock has 10 percent return in month 
one and two while the benchmark has 0 percent return in both month one and two. The 
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two-month CAR for the stock is 20 percent [i.e., 10%+10%] while two-month HPAR is 
21 percent [i.e., 110%*110%-1]. When there are more months included in the post-event 
period, compounding will produce more significant difference than non-compounding. 
Aside from reasons cited by prior literature, our study favors buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns because we are not using any normative asset pricing model to define 
the expected returns. Thus the shorter interval called by asset pricing models is not our 
concern. 
2.1.3 Calculating abnormal return across sample firms: VW vs. EW 
Researchers are interested in the general post-performance of event firms. To 
average the performance of individual returns in a sample, two common approaches are 
equal-weighted (EW) returns and value-weighted (VW) returns. Fama (1998) favors 
value-weighted returns because all the common asset pricing models have systematic 
problems in explaining the average returns of small stocks and because value-weight 
returns more accurately capture the total wealth effects experienced by investors. 
Using simulation and sensitivity analysis, however, Loughran and Ritter (2000)  
show that  value weighted returns tend to underestimate abnormal return when the event 
being studied is a  managerial choice variable.  First, value-weighted portfolios can have 
some periods in which a single big firm is a large proportion of the portfolio, causing a 
high variance of returns because the firms risk is not diversified away. The resulting low 
power will manifest itself in large standard errors and low t-statistics. Second, we have 
reasons to believe the significant abnormal returns are more pronounced for small firms, 
not because common asset pricing models have systematic  problem explaining small 
stocks average abnormal returns, but because the misevaluations due to cognitive biases 
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are more easily traded away for big stocks than for small stocks. Small-cap stocks usually 
have a wider percentage of bid-ask spreads than do large-cap stocks. Also, trading on a 
small stock will more easily affect its price than on a big stock. As a result, the ability to 
capitalize on the same percentage of misevaluation for a small stock will be less than for 
a big stock. Abnormal returns, on average should be more pronounced for small stocks 
than for big stocks. Loughran and Ritter (2000)   also show that in simulations, 
misevaluations are most severe among small firms in high-volume periods, while value-
weighted returns only pick up a portion of the abnormal returns. 
We also argue that equal-weighted and value-weighted returns address different 
research questions. Value-weighted returns answer whether an investor who holds the 
value-weighted portfolio of event firms will earn abnormal returns while equal-weighted 
returns answers whether on average, event  firms have abnormal returns. Since our 
concern in this study is, on average, whether firms announcing dividend cuts and 
omissions have abnormal returns in the long-run, we choose equal-weighted returns as 
our measurements of portfolio returns. However, we will also address the concern of 
Fama (1998) about the size effect by splitting our sample into different size deciles and 
by regressing LRARs against firm sizes. 
2.1.4 Drawing inferences 
Conventional t-statistics requires the variables to be independent. The 
independence of abnormal return of sampled firms is assumed in traditional event study. 
However, if the calendar time of the event overlaps for two or more than two firms, the 
abnormal return of these firms might be dependent. Fama(1998) argues that the problem 
  
28
is more severe in long-term BHARs because more firms have events within a given five-
year window than within a three-day window.  
Several approaches emerge to solve the possibility of erroneous inferences in 
long-horizon event studies. Ikenberry et al. (1995) propose using empirical distribution 
generated by simulation to replace theoretical distribution of average long-horizon 
abnormal return and infers if the observed performance of sample firms is consistent with 
this distribution. For each event firm (repurchase announcement in their study), they 
randomly replace it with a firm that has the same size and book-to-market ranking that 
point of time. They treat this randomly selected matching firm as if it had the same event 
on the same day as the corresponding event firm. The matching process continues until 
each event firm has its partner. This matching portfolio will have one randomly drawn 
firm for each actual event firm. Then, they estimate the abnormal performance of this 
matching portfolio in the same manner as they did for the calculating the abnormal return 
of the event firm portfolio. This yields one average abnormal return in the same post-
event period as the event firms. The entire process is then repeated until another pseudo-
portfolio is formed and another abnormal return is calculated. This process is repeated 
1000 times and thus generates 1000 pseudo-portfolios and 1000 abnormal returns. The 
1000 abnormal returns provide an empirical distribution of abnormal returns drawn under 
the null model. The null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns is then rejected at the α 
percent level if the abnormal return obtained from the event portfolio is greater than the 
(1-α) percentile abnormal return observed from the empirical distribution. The 
attractiveness of  this empirical distribution approach is that is avoids many of the 
problems that underlying the assumptions of conventional t-tests. Since these problems, if 
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there are any in calculating event firm abnormal return, also exist in the pseudo-portfolio, 
they are automatically accounted for in the test. Ikenberry et al. (1996) also use this 
approach in studying the long-run performance following stock splits. Brav (2000), 
however, suggests two potential shortcomings of Ikenberry et al. (1995)s bootstrap 
approach. First, if the original sample and replacement samples have  systematically 
different residual variations then the resulting empirical distribution will be biased. 
Second, if the original samples abnormal returns are cross-sectionally correlated then the 
replacement with random samples, which by construction are uncorrelated, may lead to 
false inferences. 
Brav (2000) presents an elaborate scheme to adjust for the cross-correlation of 
long-term BHARs. But Fama (1998) suggests that such a full solution is not typically 
available because the number of return covariance to be estimated is greater than the 
number of time-series observations. 
The rolling portfolio approach suggested by Fama (1998) is applied to address 
cross-sectional dependence of abnormal returns. The rolling portfolio approach was first 
used by Jaffe(1974), and later applied by Loughran and Ritter (1995), Brav and Gompers 
(1997), Michell and Stafford (2000), and Boehme and Sorescu (2002)  to avoid cross-
sectional dependence of abnormal returns. For each calendar  month, a portfolio is 
formed by including all firms having  the  event  during the [ c-h, c-1] period, where c is 
the calendar month and h is the investment horizon of interest. For each calendar month, 
the abnormal return on each stock is calculated by subtracting the expected return from 
the actual return. The expected return  can be estimated in either time-series or cross-
sectional approach described in previous section. Averaging the abnormal return of all 
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the stocks in that calendar month portfolio produces the abnormal return for the month on 
the portfolio. The portfolio is reformed every month and the same process of calculating 
portfolio abnormal return on that month is repeated. The time-series standard deviation 
and mean of abnormal portfolio returns is used to calculate the t-statistics to test whether 
the average monthly abnormal return of events stocks is equal to zero. Since the time-
series variation of the monthly abnormal return on the portfolio already captures the 
effects of the correlation of returns across event stocks missed by the model for expected 
returns, the problem of cross-sectional dependence of abnormal return is solved.  
Loughran and Ritter (2000), however, strongly oppose the rolling portfolio approach and 
argue that it is the least  powerful test of market efficiency. They suggest that usually 
there will be more events in some months than others because firms tend to pick up 
periods of misevaluation and announce corporate  events such as SEOs, merger, and 
share purchases to take advantage of misevaluation. Rolling portfolio approach weights 
each month equally and will have less power than weighting firms equally.  
2.1.5 Time-series regression 
Different from the general approaches mentioned above, time-series regression 
regresses the post-event  excess returns in  event month t (actual return minus risk free 
rate, or actual return minus the return on a matching firm, or matching portfolio)  for an 
event firm (or event-firm-portfolio) on some risk factors. The interception is then 
interpreted as average monthly abnormal return . There is no estimation period used.  
Agrawal et al. (1992) regress the  monthly  excess return (actual return minus the equal 
weighted average return on the control portfolio in the same size decile as the event firm)  
of an event firm on market risk premium in the same month. The most commonly used 
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asset pricing model in time-series regression is Fama-French three-factor-model. The 
post-event monthly excess return for firm j is regressed on a market factor, a size factor, 
and a book-to-market factor. One-month Treasury bill rate is usually used as risk free 
rate. Market factor is the return on a value-weighted market index minus risk free rate. 
Size factor is the return on a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks less the return on a 
value-weighted portfolio of big stocks. Book-to-market factor is the return on a value-
weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks less the return on a  value-weighted 
portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. The intercept term is the average abnormal return 
across the post-event months. A negative  intercept indicates that after controlling for 
market, size and book-to-market factors, a sample firm has under-performed the market. 
The regression can also be done at the portfolio level rather than on individual firm level 
in calendar-time portfolio approach. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and Boehme and 
Sorescu (2002) regress calendar-time portfolio excess returns on the three Fama and 
French factors. In Mitchell and Stafford (2000) , as well as Boehme and Sorescu (2002), 
a rolling portfolio is first created. The following regression is then conducted: 
R p,t  R f,t = α p + β p (R m,t  R f,t) + s p SMB t + h pLMH t + e p,t  
Where R p,t Represents the calendar time portfolio of event firms,  and R f,t is the 
monthly T-bill return. The three independent variables are Fama-French three factors in 
each month. The intercept is then interpreted as the mean abnormal return across all 
calendar months.  
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2.2 Our methodology 
2.2.1 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
Barber and Lyon (1999) advocate the use of carefully constructed benchmark 
portfolios that are free of the new listing and rebalancing biases. Their approach 
relies on a traditional event study framework and the calculation of buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns using a carefully constructed reference portfolio. Although this 
improved method yields well-specified test statistics in random samples, Barber and 
Lyon show that it also yields misspecified test statistics in nonrandom samples. By 
random samples, Barber and Lyon mean these sample firms are randomly drawn , 
compared to nonrandom samples where sample firms have common bonds because they 
all have the same event ( IPO or changing dividends, for instance).  The misspecification 
in nonrandom samples, as Barber and Lyon suggest, is due to the inability of firm size 
and book-to-market ratio to capture all of the misspecification of the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model. Barber and Lyon, as well as other researchers call for examining other 
variables like recent return performance in long-run study. They also recommend that 
researchers compare sample firms to the general population on the basis of more firm 
characteristics. They believe that a thoughtful descriptive analysis would provide insights 
regarding the important dimensions on which researchers should develop a performance 
benchmark. Answering the call for investigating more firm characteristics other than size 
and book-to-market, our research incorporates important characteristics that may be 
associated with the cross-sectional expected return of stocks. These variables, besides 
size and book-to-market ratio, include industry, prior stock performance and leverage. 
Although researchers may argue there will be no ending of selection of these firm 
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characteristics because capturing all  dimensions is impossible, the variables we choose 
to match stock performance have been proven to be strongly related to cross-sectional 
difference in expected stock returns, either by empirical evidence or theoretical models. 
We also find that when not matching by these variables, sample firms have much higher 
or lower values than matching firms, which explain why we should match by these 
variables. We discuss these variables in detail in chapter 3. 
We follow the description of Lyon and Barber (1999) to calculate holding period 
abnormal return(HPAR). 
For an individual stock, holding period return is defined as: 
1))1((),,( −+= ∏
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where ),,( baiHPR  is holding period return for company i during the period from a 
to b;   itR is the daily return on common share of company i in day t.  
Excess (abnormal) return for an individual stock is calculated as the difference 
between an event-firm and a matching firm or a matching portfolio(CRSP equally-
weighted index, for example).  
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Where ER(i,a,b) = Excess return for firm i from time period a to b, itR = the daily 
return on common share of company i in day t, Rmt  is either the return on a reference 
portfolio or a matching firm in day t. If an event firm (firms announcing dividend 
changes) is delisted prior to the end of holding period,  truncated return series are 
included in analysis of holding period. The average holding period abnormal return   is  
then calculated as: 
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Where HPAR is the average holding period abnormal return. N  is the number of 
firms. Lyon and Barber (1999) use two methods to calculate the long-run returns on a 
portfolio. First, in each month they calculate the mean return for each portfolio and then 
compound this mean return over all months in the long-run period. Their second method 
involves first compounding the returns on securities constituting the portfolio across time 
and then averaging  them across securities in that portfolio. The first method, however, 
suffers from rebalancing biases and does not capture the real return to an investor who 
holds the portfolio until the end of the period. Consider a portfolio that consists of only 
two stocks: A and B. Stock A has a positive return of 100 percent both in month 1 and 
month 2 while stock B has zero return in both months. A investors investing 1 $ in each 
stock will accumulate 4$ in stock A and 1$ in stock B, making his portfolio return equals 
150 percent at the end of month 2 [ i.e.,  ( (5-2)/2*100% )] . However, using method 1, 
which average the individual stock return in a month first and then compounding the 
portfolio return through time will generate a return of 125 percent [i.e.,   
(1+50%)*(1+50%)-1 ]. The 25 percent bias is due to the assumption of rebalancing. 
Since our method compounding the daily return of each individual stock first, we are free 
from the rebalancing bias.  
Barber and Lyon (1997) document that BHARs, using a reference portfolio such 
as market index, are mis-specified and are subject to new listing, rebalancing, and 
skewness biases. As we are using a matching firm, not a reference portfolio for each 
replacing firm, a conventional t-statistic can be used to evaluate statistical significance of 
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average abnormal returns (Barber & Lyon, 1997).  Conventional t-Statistics are based on 
the cross-sectional standard deviations of the abnormal returns during the relevant period. 
2.2.2 Calendar time portfolio approach 
Fama (1998) argues that the holding period matching methodology does not 
adequately control for the cross-sectional correlation among individual firms. He 
suggests that any methodology that ignores cross-sectional dependence of event-firm 
abnormal returns that are overlapping in calendar time is likely to produce overstated test 
statistics. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) find empirical evidence that holding period 
methodology is likely to produce overstated t-statistics. To control for possible cross-
sectional correlation among our sample firms, we also apply the Fama-French calendar 
portfolio methodologies. 
 For each calendar  month, a portfolio is formed by including all firms having  
dividend reduction or omission events  during the [ c-i, c-j] prior period, where c is the 
calendar month. i and j are integers ranging from 1 to 60, and  i > j. For instance, if i = 12 
and j = 1, we are investigating the twelve months LRARs following dividend omissions 
or reductions. If and i = 24  j =13, we are interested in the abnormal performance of the 
period between post-announcement year 1 and year 2. Since i is bigger than 0, firms 
announcing dividend omissions or reductions in a calendar month is excluded from that 
calendar month portfolio. 
We then estimate the following three-factor regression model described by 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and applied by Boehme and Sorescu (2002) . 
R p,t  R f,t = α p + β p (R m,t  R f,t) + s p SMB t + h pLMH t + e p,t  
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Where R p,t represents the return of calendar time portfolio of dividend event firms 
in month t,  and R f,t is the monthly one-month Treasury bill rate. The three independent 
variables are Fama-French three factors in each month. Market factor is the return on a 
value-weighted market index minus risk free rate. Size factor is the return on a value-
weighted portfolio of small stocks less the return on a value-weighted portfolio of big 
stocks. Book-to-market factor is the return on a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-
market stocks less the return on a  value-weighted portfolio of low book-to-market 
stocks. The intercept is then interpreted as the mean monthly abnormal return of the event 
portfolio across all months. Because the number of firms contained in any given month 
might be different, we estimate the regression using both ordinary (OLS) and weighted 
least square (WLS) procedures. 
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Chapter 3: Data 
3.1 Sample construction 
The sample consists of 1326 announcements of dividend omissions and 
reductions made over the period of 1963 through 1995.  Announcements of cash dividend 
reductions or omissions are obtained by searching the stock master file of the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and the Standard and Poors COMPUSTAT tapes for 
firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX) or NASDAQ which reduced or omitted their regular cash dividends to their 
common shareholders during the 1963 to 1995 period.  Firms from this list are included 
in the final sample if they meet the following screening criteria: 
1. The cash dividend reduction or omission is either the first in the companys 
history or the first after at least five years of continuous, non-reduced dividend payments.  
This criterion increases the likelihood that the announcements in the sample are 
unanticipated and represent major shifts in the dividend policies of these firms. 
2. The announcement appears in the Wall Street Journal and is the first public 
statement of the impending reduction or omission. 
3. The announcement is not contaminated by other firm-specific information 
announced on the same trading day or the preceding day. 
4. The announcement does not pertain to a firm undergoing liquidation or a 
merger. 
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5. The announcement does not pertain to a regulated industry such as utilities, 
holding firm, or other investment firm. Dividends of these firms are often a fixed 
percentage of earnings. 
6. The announcement does not pertain to an American Depository Receipt 
(ADR) or a Canadian company. This criterion is imposed to avoid problems associated 
with different payment conventions in other countries. 
7. The announcing firm has sufficient data on the CRSP tape to meet the 
requirements of the empirical tests. 
In addition, the sample of dividend omissions excludes announcements of stock 
dividends in lieu of cash dividends and also dividend omissions following dividend cuts 
in the earlier quarter. 
The final sample consists of 654 dividend omissions and 672 dividend reductions.  
Panel A of Table 2 presents the distributions of the samples by calendar years. Inspection 
of  Panel A  shows that the number of dividend omissions and reductions were not evenly 
distributed over the whole sample period. The average annual  omissions and reductions 
for 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s are  26, 52, 44 and  26 respectively. Overall, any 
clustering of announcements is consistent with the general performance of the U.S. 
economy. Panel B of Table 2 shows the industry representation of the samples. Panel C 
reports the frequency of number of dividend announcements per four-digit SIC industry.  
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3.2 Matched firm selection    
   Fama (1998) argues that LRARs documented by previous literature may 
disappear if matching criteria change. To address the robustness across different 
methodologies, we apply seven matching criteria. A list of matching methodologies used 
in previous literature is summarized in Panel B of  table 1. 
   We use the following sets of criteria to create the matching samples: (1) size, (2) 
size and industry, (3) size and prior performance (4) industry and prior performance (5) 
size, industry and prior performance (6) book-to-market and size, (7) leverage and size. 
For all seven benchmarks, the control firms are also matched by trading system.  Firms 
that omit or cut dividends for the five years before and five years after the announcement 
by the corresponding sample firm are excluded from the matching sample. When a 
matching firm is delisted prior to the end of holding period, the next best matching firm is 
substituted at close of trading on the date of delisting. 
3.2.1 Matched by size 
   For each sample firm, we choose a non-event matching firm. The matching 
process is to find a non-event firm from the CRSP database with size closest to a sample 
firm. Matching is done one month before the announcement.  
3.2.2 Matched by size and industry 
   If industry is actually a factor in determining cross-sectional abnormal return, 
clustering in an industry of sample firms may lead to the mis-specified model problem. 
The simulation of Barber and Lyon shows that if sample firms are drawn from the same 
SIC code industry, the empirical rejection level is much higher than the theoretical level. 
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However, they also show that if sampled firms are drawn from four or more two-digit 
SIC code, misspecification disappears. Our sample distribution does not indicate that 
sampled firms are clustered in less than four two-digit SIC code industries, but we still 
control for industry for caution. For each sample firm, we find a non-event firm with the 
closest size among the firms with the same first two-digit of the CRSP (SIC) code. Size is 
also matched one month before the announcement.  
Firth (1996) finds that announcement of dividend changes is also associated with 
abnormal announcement  return of firms in the same industry. If dividend announcement 
will influence the long-run stock return of firms in the same industry, using industry as a 
matching factor might be unable pick up the whole effect of dividend announcement on 
announcing firms in the long-run. 
3.2.3 Matched by size and prior performance  
Pre-announcement abnormal return is common prior to event announcement. 
Equity issuance is generally preceded by a period of high returns and share repurchases 
with low pre-announcement returns. Fama(1998) offers a complete list of studies 
documenting pre-announcement abnormal returns.  As in dividend literature,  Michaely, 
Thaler and Womack (1995) find negative long-run  abnormal return preceding dividend 
omissions while positive excess return prior to initiations. Benartzi et al. (1997) 
document that for the twelve months prior to the announcement of dividend changes, 
firms that cut their dividends have lost 28.1 percent relative to their size-matched 
portfolios while firms increasing dividends have an average 8.6 percent prior excess 
returns . 
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  When market is inefficient, prior abnormal performance may influence post-
announcement performance. Chan et al. (1996) document the persistence, or momentum, 
of stock returns over horizons of six months to a year. Since most firms announcing 
dividend reductions or omissions also experience poor prior performance, our results of 
negative post-announcement price drift could be simply a momentum effect, especially 
when much of the abnormal return happens in the first year. 
 BSV (1998)s investor sentiment model suggests that stocks with negative past 
abnormal returns are overvalued and tend to outperform while securities with poor prior 
performance become  undervalued  and subsequently earn superior returns. Also, a 
simulation based on the period from 1973 to 1994 by Barber and Lyon (1999) shows that 
the distribution of abnormal return is different for high pre-event return firms and low 
pre-event return firms. More specifically, for firms with high pre-event momentum, 
conventional t-tests are positively biased for one-year horizon, and negatively biased for 
three- and five- year horizons. For firms with low pre-event momentum, conventional t-
tests are negatively biased for one-year horizon, but positively biased for three-year 
horizon. The implication of Barber and Lyon (1999) is that the post-abnormal return 
might be caused by pre-announcement abnormal return, either explained by mean-
reversion or underreaction. The dividend cut or omission anomalies might be altered by 
pre-event momentum anomaly. We therefore control for this pre-event abnormal return 
effect by choosing prior performance as matching criteria. 
Prior performance is matched in the period beginning at one year prior to the 
announcement and ending on the announcement day. We first choose non-event firms 
whose market value of equity one month before the announcement is between 60% and 
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140% of market value of equity of sample firm at the same time. Then we select the firm 
with the closest one-year pre-event stock performance from this set as our matching firm. 
3.2.4 Matched by industry and prior performance 
From candidate firms with the same two-digit CRSP SIC code, we select the 
matching firm with the closest one-year pre-event stock performance.  
3.2.5 Matched by size, industry and prior performance 
We first choose non-event firms whose market value of equity one month before 
the announcement is between 60% and 140% of the contemporaneous market value of 
equity of sample firm and with the same two-digit SIC code. Then we select the firm with 
the closest one-year pre-event performance from this set as our matching firm.      
3.2.6 Matched by size and book-to-market ratio 
Fama and French (1992) find a significantly positive cross-sectional relationship 
between expected stock return and book-to-market value. Book-to-market value was later 
included in their three-factor model (Fama and French,1993). Since dividend omissions 
and reductions are often preceded by poor stock performance, we might expect that, on 
average, our sample firms have higher book-to-market ratios than non-event firms. We 
therefore construct another group of firms matched by size and book-to-market ratios.   
We first choose non-event firms whose market value of equity at the last trading 
day of one month prior to the announcement is between 60% and 140% of the 
contemporaneous market value of equity of sample firm. From this set, we choose the 
firm with the closest book-to-market ratio as the matching firm. The book-to-market ratio 
is measured at the end of prior fiscal year. As in Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), the 
book-to-market ratio is calculated using the firms book value of common equity 
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(Compustat annual data item A60) divided by its market value of equity (the product of 
Compustat annual items A25 and A199 respectively).  
3.2.7 Matched by size and leverage 
If an event changes the risk of underlying stocks, the documented LRARs might 
be attributed to this change. Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000) argues that a consistent 
explanation to the equity issue puzzle is, as equity issuers reduce leverage, their exposure 
to unexpected inflation and default risks decrease, thus decreasing their stocks expected 
returns relative to matched firms. In research on dividend initiation and assumption, 
Boehme and Sorescu (2002) observed significant decrease in the loading of Fama-French 
three risk factor. The decreased risk is attributed to the more stable earnings of the 
underlying company. Although leverage might be a potential explanation for the 
documented anomaly, these studies did not directly match a sample firm by leverage.  
  Although no prior literature documents that firms announcing dividend 
omissions or reductions have lower or higher leverage ratio than the average, matching 
by leverage and size helps to remove the doubt that abnormal return is caused by 
different leverage between our portfolio and the matching portfolio. We also find that 
when not matching by leverage, event firms tend to have higher leverage ratio than the 
matching firms. 
   When matching by size and leverage, we first choose non-event firms whose 
market value of equity at the last trading day of  one month prior to the announcement is 
between 60% and 140% of the contemporaneous market value of equity of sample firm. 
From this set, we choose the firm with the closest debt-to-asset ratio as the matching 
firm. We define the debt-to-asset ratio as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current 
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liabilities, divided by total assets, measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the 
announcement of dividend changes. 
In  Table 3, We examine how well our matching procedures match the event firms 
with benchmark firms on those potential risk factors.  As size is a matching factor for all 
matching samples except matching by performance and industry, mean values for market 
value of equity are similar for all event and matching samples. When matching by prior 
performance and industry, the average size of  matching firms is almost twice large as the 
sample firms.   
When performance is not one of the criteria in  matching, consistent with our 
empirical results on prior performance, all announcing  firms have  negative prior 
performance (about 20 percent) compared with all positive prior performance for 
matching firms. When book-to-market is not the matching criteria, event firms have 
higher book-to-market ratio than matching firms. When leverage is not the matching 
criteria, event firms have higher leverage than matching firms. When size, prior 
performance, book-to-market ratio and leverage are used as matching criteria either 
solely or combining with other criteria, these factors are closely matched. Overall, firms 
omitting or reducing their dividends have smaller size, poorer prior performance, higher 
book-to-market ratio and  higher leverage ratio than matching firms, when these criteria 
are not used as matching benchmarks. Because literature has documented that size, prior 
performance, book-to-market ratio and  leverage are associated with expected returns, 
this comparison between sample firm characteristics and event firm characteristics justify 
why we should match by these criteria.  
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Chapter 4:  Market reaction following  announcements  
4.1 Announcement abnormal returns 
A standard event-study method is used to analyze the effects of announcements of 
dividend reductions and omissions on the stock price of the announcing firms. Abnormal 
returns are computed as the prediction error εjt in the market model:  Rjt  =  αj  +  βj Rmt  
+ εjt    where Rjt  and Rmt are respectively the continuously compounded rates of return to 
stock j and the equally-weighted CRSP index over day t, and αj and βj are ordinary-least-
squares (OLS) estimates. The estimation period is day -180 through day -31 relative to 
the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) announcement date. 
Tests of the statistical significance of the average abnormal stock returns 
cumulated over periods around the announcement dates are based on the cross-sectional 
standard deviations of the abnormal returns.  
 Table 4 reports that the average two-day cumulative abnormal stock return at 
announcements of dividend omissions or reductions is 6.62 percent (significant at the 1 
percent level), with 84.5 percent of the sample dividend omitting or reducing firms 
suffering capital losses.   
Because firms announcing dividend omission and reductions usually experience 
poor return prior to announcement day, using the estimation period prior to 
announcement day may cause announcement effect bias. We also used a post-event 
estimation period  from 30 to 180 days after announcement date, and an estimation period 
including both prior and post-announcement periods. The results, although not reported, 
are similar. 
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Table 4 also shows  that cash dividend reduction and omission announcements are 
partially anticipated. The average cumulative abnormal stock returns over periods of ten, 
twenty, and thirty days before the announcement date are all negative (and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level).  
Panel B also examines whether there is a contemporaneous risk change for the 
dividend reducing or omitting firms. It reports the results of the parametric t-test for the 
paired comparisons of the (OLS) beta coefficients prior versus post the announcement, 
assuming unequal variances (the results are the same assuming equal variances). The null 
hypothesis tested is that the mean difference between the beta coefficients prior to the 
announcement and the post-announcement beta coefficients equals zero.  The post-
announcement beta coefficients are estimated using the above market model over the 
period day +31 through day +180 relative to the WSJ announcement date. We do find 
there is a significant increase in beta after announcement, which is 0.1 higher than the 
beta before announcement. We will explore the relationship between the change of beta 
and LRARs in later sections. 
4.2  Post-announcement  results using buy-and-hold matching methodologies 
4.2.1 Post-announcement results during the whole sample period 
  Table 5  reports the holding period abnormal returns  for up to five years after 
dividend omissions or reductions events during the period 1963 to 1995. The  matching 
firms are created using seven sets of criteria: (1) size, (2) size and industry, (3) size and 
prior stock performance, (4) industry and prior stock performance, (5) size, industry and 
prior stock performance, (6) book-to-market ratio and size, (7) leverage (debt-to-asset 
ratio) and size. Since the data of book-to-market ratios and debt-to-asset ratios are only 
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available for 1980-1995 period, results for (6) and (7) currently only include the 1980-
1995 period. Firms that omit or cut dividends for the five years before and five years after 
the announcement by the corresponding sample firm are excluded from the matching 
sample. Because firms announcing dividend omissions or reductions experience 
abnormal negative return on announcement day (day 0) and the day following 
announcement day (day +1), including this short term effect  would make the long-run 
results suspicious. As in Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) and others, we exclude 
day 0 and day +1 from the post-announcement period.  Although average abnormal return 
is of interest for investors and thus a good indicator for abnormal performance, it could 
be driven by extreme bad or good stock performance. It could be the case that even if 
most firms over-perform, the average abnormal return is still negative because of outliers. 
Table 5 also reports the percentage of underperformance firms.  
  As displayed in table 5, the one-,two-, three-, four- and five-year holding period 
abnormal returns are all negative and significant at 1 percent level, no matter which 
matching criteria we apply. The magnitude of price drift is monotonic increasing as long-
horizon increases for all matching criteria. Our results suggest that the post-
announcement negative price drift is robust to all matching methodologies.  
More specifically, when matched by  size,  size and industry, size and 
performance, industry and performance, and size, industry and performance over the 
period 1963 through 1995, the average one-year holding period abnormal returns range 
from 7.31 percent to 14.63 percent; three-year holding period abnormal returns range 
from 14.09 percent to 24.50 percent, and five-year holding period abnormal returns 
range from 21.95 percent to 28.80 percent,  depending on the matching criteria used. 
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When matched by CRSP equally weighted index, the average one-year holding period 
abnormal return is 13.05 percent; three-year holding period abnormal return is 25.95 
percent and  five-year holding period abnormal return is 53.11 percent. When matched 
by book-to-market ratio and size, and by leverage and size for the 1980 to 1995 period, 
their average one-year holding period abnormal returns were-13.32 and 17.29 percent, 
three-year holding period abnormal returns were 43.91 percent and 30.49 percent, and 
five-year holding period abnormal returns were 75.37 percent and  35.84 percent, 
respectively.   
4.2.2 Are abnormal results caused by mis-matching ? 
  Fama (1998)  argues that  matching by different criteria  often produces different 
results and matching criteria previously used do not capture all factors than influence  
cross-firm variation in average returns. The negative post-announcement abnormal 
returns indicate underperformance only to the extent that the risk of announcing firms is 
not smaller than that of matching firms.  In Table 3, we already examined how well our 
matching procedures match the event firms with benchmark firms on those potential risk 
factors. Overall, firms omitting or reducing their dividends have smaller size, poorer prior 
performance, higher book-to-market ratio and higher leverage ratio than matching firms, 
when these criteria are not used as matching benchmarks. Since smaller size, higher 
book-to-market ratios generally are associated higher expected returns, they can not be 
used to explain the underperformance for our event firms. 
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4.3 The duration and magnitude of long-run abnormal returns 
  Although table 5 documents significantly negative abnormal performance for the 
one-, to five- year horizons, the duration of LRARs could be overstated. For instance, a 
large negative abnormal return in year one may cause two-year, three-year holding period 
abnormal returns to be significantly negative as well, even when there is no actual 
abnormal return in year two and year three. Although this problem exists when 
calculating cumulative abnormal returns in event study, it becomes more severe in 
calculating long-run holding period abnormal returns  because of compounding. Fama 
(1998) points out that buy-and-hold abnormal returns can give false impression of the 
speed of price adjustment to an event. For instance, if the holding period return(HPR) for 
firm A is 10 percent in the first year  while 0 percent for matching firm M, and the HPR 
for firm A and M are both 20 percent in the second year, the HPR for firm A in two years 
become 32% while the HPR for firm M in two years is 20%. Although there is no 
abnormal return after year one, the two-year holding period abnormal return(HPAR) 
becomes 12%, 2% higher that one-year HPAR, giving the false impression that there is 
still abnormal behavior after year one. Mathematically, the overstating of the magnitude 
and horizon of LRARs could be proved as following: 
Let Rit represent the raw return for event firm i at day t, and Rmt represent the raw 
return for matching  firm m at day t. Let HPR(i,a,c) represent the holding period raw return 
for firm i from day a to day c,  and HPR(m,a,c) represent the holding period raw return for 
firm m from day a to day c. Let ),,( caiHPAR  represent  the holding period abnormal return 
from day a to day c for event firm i.  HPARi,a,b) denotes  the holding period abnormal 
return from day a to b for firm i, and  HPAR(i,b,c)   is the holding period abnormal return 
  
50
from day b to c for firm i (Holding period a to c is split into two consequent sub-periods: 
a to b and b to c.) 
),,(),,(),,( camcaicai HPRHPRHPAR −=  
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itR is positive and monotonic increasing through time. 
It is easy to see that as long as )1( +∏
=
c
bt
itR  is monotonic increasing as c increases, 
the absolute value of ),,( caiHPAR  is monotonic increasing even there is no abnormal 
behavior after day b, implying both  the magnitude and horizon of HPAR is overstated. 
To gain  insight into the duration of abnormal returns, we examine the holding 
period abnormal returns in each of the five post-announcement years separately. In table 
6, we present the annual post-announcement abnormal stock returns from the first year to 
the fifth year. Surprisingly, none of the years after the first year exhibit significant 
abnormal performance (except 2nd and 3rd year when matched by size and book-to-market 
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ratio for the period from 1980 through 1995). Some years even generate positive 
abnormal returns, although not significant. The large and significant negative holding
period abnormal performance is actually a compounding effect from the abnormal 
performance of the first year, as predicted by the mathematic model above. Prior 
literature looking at the whole three- or five-year holding period abnormal performance 
and concluding that market fails to correct the under- or over- reaction after three or five 
years might suffer form this compounding effect. Our results suggest, for firms 
announcing dividend omissions and reductions, that although they suffer long-run 
abnormal negative price drift, the underreaction is corrected within one year. The 
compounding effect is illustrated in figure 1.  
4.4 Post-announcement results using Fama-French calendar time portfolio 
approach       
Panel A of Table 7 reports the long-run abnormal stock returns using Fama-
French methodology previously described for the one- , two-, three, four-, and five-year 
post-announcement horizons, for the combined sample of omissions and reductions 
during 1963 to 1995. Consistent with what we find using holding period matching 
procedure, we document significantly negative price drift for the one- to five-year 
postannouncement horizon. The intercepts suggest monthly abnormal stock performance 
of 0.74, -0.46, -0.33, -0.34 and 0.33 percent for one-, two-, three-, four-, five-year 
postannouncement horizon, respectively for OLS estimation. The intercepts are 
significant at the one percent level for one-, and two-year postannouncement horizon, and 
significant at five percent level for three-, four-, and five-year postannouncement horizon. 
Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) suggest that holding period 
abnormal returns exacerbate the horizon of abnormal performance by compounding the 
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abnormal return at the beginning of the post-event period into the whole post-event 
period. The compounding effect has been illustrated in table 6 and figure 1. Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) also recommends Fama-French calendar time approach to avoid the 
overstating problem. However, we document that even the Fama-French calendar time 
portfolio methodology suffers from the overstating problem. Panel B investigates the 
abnormal performance in each year separately using Fama-French calendar time portfolio 
regression. The abnormal stock returns disappear after the first year, with the 3rd , 4th and  
5th  year even showing positive abnormal returns, although not significant. The lack of 
abnormal performance after the 1st  year results a diminishing pattern of abnormal stock 
returns over post-announcement period in Panel A. The magnitude of monthly abnormal 
return is 0.74 percent for the one-year horizon, while reduced to 0.33 percent for the 
five-year horizon.  Although the magnitude of long-run postannouncement abnormal 
performance is not exacerbated by the compounding effects in the holding period 
approach, the horizon of abnormal performance is still over stated. The documented two-, 
three-, four-, and five-year postannouncement abnormal stock returns are results of 
averaging the abnormal performance in the 1st year into the remaining period. The over-
stating problem caused by averaging effect is illustrated in figure 2. Loughran and Ritter 
(2000) suggests that the Fama-French calendar time portfolio approach might 
underestimate the abnormal performance if events bunch in time because they are 
motivated by economic-wide misvaluation. However, the similarity between OLS and 
WLS results in table 7 does not support this event-bunching argument. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
The wealth effect of dividend policy changes have been of considerable interest to 
researchers and corporate managers. Although the short-run negative impact of reducing 
or omitting dividends have been well documented in literature, we find that the 
magnitude of price drop in the announcement window is misleading since the market 
does not incorporate the full effect of dividend policy changes in the short-run. Our paper 
examines the long-run stock performance following dividend omissions and reductions 
from 1963 to 1995 using various matching methodologies and Fama-French calendar 
portfolio regressions. We document significantly negative long-run abnormal stock 
returns for up to five years after announcement. The results are not sensitive to different 
methodologies and support the notion that the market underreacts to firm-specific news.  
However, we find the horizon of long-run post-announcement abnormal returns might be 
overstated in prior literature. When looking at each year individually, we find the 
abnormal performance is confined in the first postannouncement year. The LRARs 
beyond the first year reflect the compounding effects for buy-and-hold methodology.  
Our results do provide compelling evidence of what Fama (1998) called  pitfalls in using 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns to judge the long-term drift associated with an event. We 
also show that even the Fama-French calendar portfolio regression is not free of this  
pitfall, although it is less severe than using buy-and-hold methodologies. For the 1963-
95 period, the average  monthly abnormal return calculated from Fama-French regression 
for firms announcing dividend omissions or reductions within previous five years is 
0.33 percent and significant at five percent level. Investigating each year separately, 
however, shows that there is no abnormal return for the 2nd,  3rd , 4th and the 5th year. The 
  
54
abnormal returns for periods longer than one year reflect  the averaging effect, which 
brings the abnormal return in the first postannouncement year into remaining periods. 
Compared to the increasing effect of compounding by using buy-and-hold methodology, 
although the effect of averaging for Fama-French regression  is reducing as time horizon 
increases, it is still so dominating that we do document abnormal returns for up to five 
years after announcement although there is no abnormal return from the second year to 
the fifth year. 
Our paper also makes an important contribution in methodology: we caution 
future researchers of long-run abnormal stock performance following major corporate 
events to be aware of the fact that both buy-and-hold matching methodology and Fama-
French calendar time portfolio regression tend to overstate the magnitude and horizon of 
long-run abnormal performance. 
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Chapter 5 : The determinants of long-run abnormal returns 
5.1 Introduction 
In essay two, we will investigate the relationship between the LRARs following  
the announcement of dividend omissions or reductions and firm characteristics and 
market conditions  that surround the announcement. Previous studies on LRARs focus on 
the average performance of event firms. Very few studies  address the determinants of the 
cross-sectional variation of LRARs. However, such characteristics might provide insights 
into the source of  market inefficiency. For instance, although IPO underperformance is 
well documented by literature (Ritter,1991; Loughran and Ritter,1995), Brav and 
Gompers (1997) find that venture capital-backed IPOs outperform non-venture capital-
backed IPOs and only non-venture capital-backed IPOs have negative LRARs.  Carter, 
Dark, and Singh (1998) find that IPOs underwritten by investment banks with the highest 
reputation does not under-perform the NASDAQ index while IPOs underwritten by less 
prestigious investment banks severely under-perform the NASDAQ index. Siew et al. 
(1998) report that  that SEO  issuers who adjust discretionary current accruals to report 
higher net income prior to the offering have lower post-issue long-run abnormal stock 
returns than issuers not aggressively managing prior earnings. Yi (2001)  documents that 
only the firms going public with negative earnings had statistically and economically 
significant long run negative abnormal returns. Overall, this literature suggests that the 
quality of IPO is associated with long-run underperformance. IPOs backed by venture 
capital, underwritten by investment banks with highest reputation, without manipulating 
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of accounting data and with positive earnings are indicators of their quality and do not 
under-perform the market. 
 The unevenly distributed LRARs across sub-samples are not unique to IPOs . 
Ikenberry et al. (1995) study the long-run stock performance following open market share 
repurchases announcements from 1980 to 1990. Although average four-year abnormal 
return is 12.1% for the whole sample, no positive price drift is found for glamour stocks 
while the average abnormal return for value stocks is 45.3%. If  value stocks are more 
likely to be repurchased because of under-valuation, this information is not fully 
absorbed by investors. Ikenberry et al. (1996) study the long-run stock performance 
following stock splits. Although they find significant positive post-split abnormal returns 
for the whole spiting sample, splits undertaken by firms with low share price or negative 
pre-split returns are associated with negative post-split long-run returns.  
In a recent paper on dividend initiation and assumption, Boehme and Sorescu 
(2002), finds that long-run post-announcement over performance of firms announcing 
dividend assumptions and initiations is confined  to small firms.  These findings suggest 
that treating firms changing dividends universally might miss important information in 
long-run study.  
Although literature suggests that some firm characteristics might be associated 
with long-run market inefficiency, no prior literature has extensively investigated the 
resource of LRARs. In this section, we examine what kind of firms are mostly subject to 
behavior biases in order to discover the sources of underperformance following dividend 
omissions and reductions. Since we document that the long-run post-announcement 
abnormal behavior is mainly confined to the first year following announcement, our 
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analysis of long-run in chapter 5 focuses only on the market behavior in the first post-
announcement year. 
5.2  Are abnormal returns subject to chance? Robustness test across sub-periods 
5.2.1  Sub-periods by every three years 
Capital market has probably become more efficient overtime because of  
development of information technology and improved regulation. We might expect that 
underperformance would be less severe in recent years. In Agrawal et al. (1992)s  study 
on  the long-run post merger performance of acquiring firms, they find that when 
dividing their sample into sub-periods, the anomaly does not hold for the 1970s, but holds 
for 1950s, 1960s and 1980s. Since the underperformance in the 1980s is as severe as the 
underperformance in the 1950s and the 1960s, their results do not suggest the market 
becomes more efficient over time. 
Fama (1998) argues that the price drift following dividend changes observed by 
Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) in their 1964-1988 period  might merely be a 
sample specific coincidence and  suggests that inferences about long-term returns should 
probably await an out-of-sample test. Knowing whether or not the long-run negative 
abnormal returns documented in this study could survive different sub-periods is critical 
to answer the argument that  the results are generated by chance versus  by market 
underreaction.  
  In Table 8, we split the entire sampling period into eleven consecutive sub- 
periods, with each sub-period including three consecutive years. Most  sub-periods show 
negative one-year post-announcement abnormal performance that is statistically 
significant. Although the average LRARs in some sub-periods are insignificantly 
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negative or positive, no sub-periods exhibit significantly positive abnormal long-run post-
announcement stock performance. We also split the whole sample periods into decades, 
or by every five years. The results, although not reported, are similar. We conclude that 
the underreaction to announcement of dividend omissions or reductions is persistent 
across time periods.  
In Panel C of table 8, we document that the short-term market reaction to the 
announcement of dividend omissions or reductions becomes much less  pronounced after 
1978. Figure 3A displays the short-run market reaction across time periods. The yearly 
average two-day market reaction is 8.07 from 1963 to  1978  while only 5.02 after 
1978. We try to explore reasons behind this change using multiple regression in later 
session. 
5.2.2  Sub-periods by economic conditions 
  Although long-run post-announcement performance is not sensitive to 
consecutive sub-periods, is it possible that the documented underreaction is sensitive to 
sub-periods defined by the general stock market condition? The BSV (1998) model 
implies that announcements in a bull market will be followed by more pronounced long-
run post-announcement performance than announcements in a bear market. According to 
BSV (1998), investors underreact to news that is in the opposite direction of previous 
news. It is possible that in a bull market, there is more good news than in a bear market.  
Investors might  tend to be more unrealistically optimistic in bull markets because of 
previous sequence of goods news and  underreact more severely to bad news like 
dividend reduction and omissions.  
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Table 9 reports the results of post-announcement long-run and short-run stock 
performance by sub-samples defined by the condition of the stock market. In this table, 
the post-announcement first-year long-term average abnormal common stock returns and 
the announcement period short-term average abnormal common stock return, for the sub-
sample of dividend event firms that made their announcement during bear markets, are 
compared to those that made their announcement during bull markets. According to Kim 
and Zumwalt (1979), a month is considered a bear market month if the stock market 
return during that month is lower than the risk-free rate. The monthly stock market 
returns are measured using the value-weighted CRSP index, and the risk-free rate is 
measured by the rate on the one-month U.S. Treasury bill. An examination of the 
distribution of the difference between the monthly stock market return and the one-month 
T-bill rate identifies significant clustering in two intervals +1% to +5% and -1% to -3%. 
For sub-sample comparisons, the statistical significance of the difference between the 
average abnormal common stock returns is tested using the parametric t-test, assuming 
unequal variances. The null hypothesis tested is that the difference is equal to zero. 
In table 9, we do find the short-run market reaction in the bear market is 
significantly different from the reaction in the bull market. The average two-day 
abnormal return is 7.11 percent when an announcement is made during the bear market, 
while in the bull market it is only 6.28 percent. The average two-day reaction in the bear 
market is 0.83 lower than the reaction in the bull market, significant at 5 percent level. 
However, the long-run abnormal performance is not subject to market condition. No 
matter if the announcement is made in a bear or bull market, we document negative one-
year abnormal performance, significant at 1 percent level for all matching criteria. We 
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can not reject the hypothesis that the difference between the average one-year abnormal 
performance for bear and bull markets is equal to zero.  
5.2.3 Fading dividends and fading market reaction  
Fama and French (2001)document a substantial decline in the percentage of firms 
paying dividends and dramatically shrinking dividend yields.  They find that the 
proportion of firms paying cash dividends falls from 66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999. 
They also document that between 1980 and 2000, the dividend yield on the S&P 500 
companies dropped from 5.4% to 1.1%. Fama and French conclude that the trend towards 
disappearing dividends is attributable not only to the changing population of firms but 
also to a lower propensity to pay dividends. Their conclusion raises an interesting 
question in our study in the short-run: On one hand, if there is a lower propensity to pay 
dividends, and if the market does not care about dividend as much as before, will the 
negative announcement market reaction towards dividend cuts and reduction become less 
pronounced? On the other hand, if the decline in the percentage of firms paying dividends 
and  shrinking dividend yields is totally attributable to IPOsfirms listing in the market 
with lower or zero dividend yields, then a hypothesis towards a less pronounced market 
reaction may not be correct. However, if the trend is partly attributable to firms cutting or 
omitting their dividends, and these firms did not experience significant loss in earnings, 
the hypothesis may sounds reasonable.  
Table 10 reports the post-announcement first-year average abnormal stock returns 
and announcement period short-term average abnormal returns for companies which 
reduced or omitted their cash dividend payment by sub-samples defined by period of 
announcement. In this table, the sample of dividend event firms is split into three sub-
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samples, according to their announcement date. The first sub-sample includes companies 
that made their announcement in the period from 1963 through 1972; the second sub-
sample covers the period from 1973 through 1985; and the third sub-sample includes the 
period from 1986 through 1995. Sub-sample comparisons are then conducted for the 
long-term average abnormal returns during the 1st year following the announcement and 
for the short-run abnormal returns (SRARs) over days -1 through day 0 relative to the 
Wall Street Journal announcement. These sub-sample comparisons are motivated by the 
findings of the study by Fama and French (2001). This study documents that the percent 
of firms paying dividends is greater than 65% in the period 1963 through 1972, drops to 
about 52% in the period 1973 through 1985, and falls to less than 35% in the period 1986 
through 1995. 
 The statistical significance of each of the average abnormal stock returns is tested 
using the parametric t-test, based on the cross-sectional standard deviations of the 
abnormal returns. The null hypothesis tested is that the average abnormal stock return is 
equal to zero. For sub-sample comparisons, the statistical significance of the difference 
between the average abnormal stock returns is tested using the parametric t-test, 
assuming unequal variances. The null hypothesis tested is that the difference is equal to 
zero. 
Our results suggest that consistent with the  trend towards a decline in the 
percentage of firms paying dividends, market reaction around announcement day  to 
dividend cuts and omissions also fades. The average  two-day cumulative abnormal 
return is 7.21 percent for period from 1963 through 1972, -6.93 percent for period from 
1973 to 1985 and only 4.76 percent from 1986 to 1995. We reject the hypothesis that the 
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difference between the two-day market reaction for period from 1963 through 1972 is 
equal to the reaction for the period from 1986 to 1995. In fact, the two-day abnormal 
return for the period from 1963 through 1972 is 2.45 percent lower than that from 1986 
through 1995, significantly different at 1 percent level. However, the long-run abnormal 
performance is not associated with the trend of fading dividends. In all sub-periods, we 
do find negative one-year abnormal performance. Although the period from 1973 through 
1985 produced more significant results, since it is between the period with the highest 
percentage of firms paying dividends and the period with the lowest percentage of firm 
paying dividends,  we can not attribute to the fading dividend trend. We can not reject the 
hypothesis that the difference between the average one-year abnormal performance for 
the period from 1963 through 1972  and for the period from 1986 though 1995  is equal 
to zero for all matching criteria except matched by CRSP equally weighted index. 
However, due to the problems associated with matching by an index as we discussed in 
previous chapters, making conclusions based on matching by CRSP equally weighted 
index alone is not enough. It is more likely that this difference might be caused by 
chance.  
5.2.4 Major political and economic events and market reaction 
When there is  major country wide political or economic news, investors might 
react differently to corporate events. One possibility is that the news introduce a high 
degree on uncertainty into the market and the announcement reaction might be more 
conservative and long-run abnormal performance could be more pronounced. However, 
there is another possibility that among periods surrounding major disasters to the 
economy like the war, stock market crash, investors tend to overreact in the short-period 
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and the negative long-run abnormal return  for our dividend events might disappear or 
event become positive. We test these competitive hypothesis by splitting our sample into 
sub-periods with major political and economic events and sub-periods without such 
events. Our results, although not reported, do not support either of these two hypotheses. 
The long-run stock performance is not influenced by these events. The negative price 
drift persistent in both sub-periods. 
5.3 Univariate analysis  
In this session, we investigate our sample by forming portfolios using one 
variable at a time. The relationship between these variables and long-run abnormal 
performance is also examined in a multivariate setting later in this chapter. 
5.3.1 Post-announcement changes in risk 
Since we observe significant increases in beta after announcement in panel B of 
table 4, if this risk changes are fully anticipated in the announcement window, the short-
term market reaction should absorb this information. However, if the market, for any 
reason, does not fully price this change  and react to this information gradually, we might 
find the risk change is associated with long-run market reaction.  Table 11 examines post-
announcement first-year average abnormal returns  and announcement period short-term 
average abnormal returns for companies which reduced or omitted their cash dividend 
payment, by sub-samples defined by post-announcement change in contemporaneous 
risk. In this table, the event firms are classified into four sub-samples, which are defined 
by the post-announcement change in their beta estimates. The average percentage change 
in beta in each of the four sub-samples is: -62.9%, -21.8%, +25.2%, and +112.1%, 
respectively. The first-year long-term average abnormal stock returns and the 
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announcement period short-term average abnormal stock return, for the sub-sample of 
event firms whose betas decreased significantly (sub-sample 1), are compared to those 
for event firms whose betas increased significantly (sub-sample 4). Similar to the study of 
Boehme and Sorescu (2002), these sub-sample comparisons are motivated by the 
possibility that the observed statistically significant first-year (long-term) abnormal stock 
returns are the result of changes in the perceived risk and, therefore, the cost of equity of 
the event firms. The beta estimates prior to the announcements are computed using the 
market model: Rjt  =  αj  +  βj Rmt  + εjt    where Rjt  and Rmt are respectively the 
continuously compounded rates of return to stock j and the equally-weighted CRSP index 
over day t, αj and βj are ordinary-least-squares (OLS) estimates, and  εjt is the error term. 
The estimation period is day -180 through day -31 relative to the Wall Street Journal 
(WSJ) announcement date. The post-announcement beta coefficients are estimated using 
the above market model over the period day +31 through day +180 relative to the WSJ 
announcement date. All the groups exhibit negative price drift in the two-day event 
window and one-year post-announcement period. We test the difference between the 
group with the largest risk decrease and the group with the largest risk increase. We can 
not reject the hypothesis that the return behavior, in both the short-run and long-run,  of 
the two groups is identical. Overall, the short-run and long-run abnormal stock 
performance is not driven by risk changes around the announcement of dividend changes. 
5.3.2 Are long-run abnormal returns only concentrated on small size firms? 
We are interested in size for two reasons. First, firm size is a commonly used 
proxy for the amount of information available about a firm. The larger the firm, the 
smaller the degree of information asymmetry and the more accurate the market reacts to 
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dividend changes around announcement. Second, Fama (1998) states that many long-run 
anomalies are concentrated on small size firms. He suggests it is because current asset 
pricing models work poorly when explaining small stocks returns. Dharan and Ikenberry 
(1995) find that the negative post-listing abnormal returns are limited to firms below the 
median  size.  Boehme and Sorescu (2002) report that the long-run price drift following 
dividend initiation and resumption is confined to the smaller firms. One possible 
explanation might be that because large firms are followed by more analysts and hold 
more by institutional investors, they may have fewer information asymmetry problems. 
Also, the markets reaction to corporate events might be more efficient compared with 
reaction to events of small firms. We explore this possibility by splitting the total sample 
into several size quartiles and examining them separately.  
Since announcement effect indicates richness of information carried by an event, 
we also have reasons to believe there might be a positive  relationship between firm size 
and announcement effect in the short-run. Smaller firms usually have less information 
released to investment society and the announcement of a major corporate event may 
carry more information to outsiders than the announcement of big firms. For instance, 
Ikenberry et al. (1996) find that the announcement return for big firms following stock 
splits is 10.04 for small firms, and only 1.01 percent for big firms. Desai and Jain (1997) 
also find that for stock splits, one-year abnormal returns for the small firms are 19.78 
percent in contrast to 4.19 percent for large firms, 3-year abnormal returns for small firms 
are 46.87 percent in comparison with only 2.15 percent for large firms. 
Table 12 reports the post-announcement first-year average abnormal stock returns 
and announcement period short term average abnormal stock returns for companies 
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which reduced or omitted their cash dividend payment by sub-samples defined by firm 
size. In this table, the event firms are classified into four sub-samples, based on their size. 
Firm size is measured by the market value of the firm as of one month before the 
announcement date using CRSP. The average firm size in each of the four sub-samples is 
$ 8.1 million, $ 25.9 million, $78.4 million, and $965.7 million, respectively. The post-
announcement first-year LRARs and the SRARs, for the sub-sample of small-size event 
firms, are compared to those for large-size event firms. For sub-sample comparisons, the 
statistical significance of the difference between the average abnormal stock returns is 
tested using the parametric t-test, assuming unequal variances. 
Our results suggest that, consistent with the size effect of short-run market 
reaction documented by Ikenberry et al. (1996) for stock splits, the average  two-day 
cumulative abnormal return is 6.87 for firms in the smallest size quartile,  compared to 
only  5.64 for the biggest size quartile. We reject the hypothesis that the difference 
between these two groups is zero. In fact, the two-day reaction for firms in the smallest 
size quartile is 1.23 percent lower than the reaction  for firms in the biggest size quartile, 
which is significantly different at 5 percent level. We conclude the announcement of 
dividend omissions and reductions has stronger impact on smaller firms than bigger firms 
in the short-run. 
In  the long-run, we find negative one-year abnormal performance for all size 
quartiles, most of them being statistically significant. The magnitude of 
underperformance is greater for the smallest size quartile than for the biggest  quartile for 
most of the matching criteria except matching by CRSP equally weighted index and 
matching by industry and prior performance. However, only when matching by size and 
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prior performance and matching by size, industry and prior performance, we find that the 
LRARs for smallest size quartile is statistically significantly lower than that for biggest 
size quartile.  
The relationship between firm size and post-announcement market reaction is 
examined in a multivariate setting later in this chapter. 
5.3.3 Are long-run abnormal returns related to the reasons cited?  
The information content is varied when different reasons are cited for dividend 
changes. More specifically, reductions or omissions citing funding future investment as 
reasons might not be such a bad news as those citing financial loss as the reason. If  
underreaction to bad news  is the explanation for long-run negative price drift, we would 
expect that the worse the news, the more pronounced the LRARs would be. We should 
expect both the short-run and long-run market reaction to be more pronounced when 
financial loss is cited than the market reaction when funding future investment is cited.  
Table 13 reports the results for sub-samples defined by reasons cited by 
management. In this table, the post-announcement first-year long-term average abnormal 
stock returns and the announcement period short-term average abnormal stock return, for 
the sub-sample of dividend event firms that cite investment opportunity as reasons for 
dividend change, are compared to those that cite financial loss as the reason. For sub-
sample comparisons, the statistical significance of the difference between the average 
abnormal stock returns is tested using the parametric t-test, assuming unequal variances. 
Our results suggest that the market does react differently in the short-run when the 
firms cite different reasons for dividend changes. The average  two-day cumulative 
abnormal return is 6.78 percent firms who cite financial loss as reasons for dividend 
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omission or reduction,  compared to only 4.32 percent for firms who cite investment 
opportunities as reasons. We reject the hypothesis that the difference between the two-
day market reaction for firms citing financial loss is equal to the reaction for firms citing 
investment opportunities. In fact, the two-day reaction for firms citing financial loss is 
2.47 percent lower than the reaction  for firms who cite investment opportunities, 
significantly different at 1 percent level.  
However, the long-run abnormal performance seems not impacted by reasons 
cited by management. We find negative one-year abnormal performance for firms cite 
either financial loss or investment opportunities as reasons for dividend changes. 
However, the LRARs for firms citing investment opportunities is not statistically 
significant for all matching criteria, but  becomes significantly negative at 1 percent level 
when management cite financial loss as reasons for dividend policy changes. Although 
the difference between investment opportunity sub-sample and financial loss sub-sample 
is always positive for all matching criteria, the difference is not statistically significant.  
5.3.4 Long-run abnormal returns and dividend yield 
Literature has documented dividend yield level has impact on market reaction to 
announcement of dividend policy changes.  
Table 14 reports the results for sub-samples defined by dividend yield. In this 
table, the event firms are classified into four sub-samples based on their dividend yield 
prior to the dividend reduction or omission announcement. The dividend yield is the ratio 
of the dollar amount of dividend per share for the year before the announcement divided 
by the share price one month before the announcement. The dollar amount of dividend 
per share for the year before announcement is obtained from COMPUSTAT. The share 
  
69
price is obtained from the master file of CRSP. The average dividend yield in each of the 
sub-samples is: 2.36%, 4.82%, 6.84%, and 10.69%, respectively. The post-announcement 
first-year long-term average abnormal stock returns and the short-term average abnormal 
stock return for the sub-sample of event firms whose dividend yield places them in the 
bottom quartile are compared to those for the sub-sample of event firms in the top 
quartile. It is expected to find significant sub-sample differences in the case of the 
SRARs because of the well documented dividend clientele effect, but in the case of the 
LRARs, there is no positive prediction, which is the motivation of this table. For sub-
sample comparisons, the null hypothesis tested is that the difference is equal to zero.  
Our results suggest that consistent with the  clientele effect, the average  two-day 
cumulative abnormal return is 4.02 for firms in the lowest dividend yield quartile,  while 
becomes  7.51 for the highest dividend quartile. We reject the hypothesis that the 
difference between them is equal to zero. In fact, the two-day reaction for firms in the 
highest dividend yield quartile is 3.50 percent lower than the reaction  for firms in the 
lowest  quartile, significantly different at 1 percent level.  
However, the long-run abnormal performance seems not associated with dividend 
yield quartiles. We find negative one-year abnormal performance for all firm quartiles 
and most of them are statistically significant. We can not reject the hypothesis that the 
difference between the average one-year abnormal performance for the lowest dividend 
yield quartile and for the highest  quartile  is equal to zero.  
  
70
 
5.3.5 Announcement abnormal returns and long-run abnormal return  
Since we have documented several factors that influence market reaction in the 
short-run, we are interested in whether the short-term market reaction, which captures 
most of the factors we studied above, can influence the long-run price drift. One 
explanation concerning the impact of short-term market reaction on long-term price drift 
is underreaction around the announcement day and slow adjustment in the post-
announcement period. We then expect that the event window short-run abnormal returns 
is only a partial realization of  total abnormal return. Edward (1968) states that : It turns 
out that opinion change is very orderly, and usually proportional to numbers calculated 
from the Bayes Theorem ¯ but it is insufficient in amount.  If this portion is relatively 
stable, we should find that SRARs is positively related to LRARs. 
Table 15 reports the results for sub-samples defined by announcement period 
short-run abnormal stock returns. In this table, the event firms are classified into three 
sub-samples based on whether their announcement period SRARs are statistically 
significantly negative, statistically insignificant, or statistically significantly positive. 
Then, the post-announcement first-year long-term average abnormal stock returns for the 
sub-sample of event firms whose announcement period SRARs are statistically 
significantly negative are compared to those for the sub-sample of event firms whose 
announcement period SRARs are statistically insignificant. The purpose of these sub-
sample comparisons is to examine the existence of any relationship between the short-
term and the LRARs. For sub-sample comparisons, the null hypothesis tested is that the 
difference is equal to zero. 
  
71
Table 15 suggests that the long-run abnormal performance does not seem to be 
strongly associated with short-run market reaction. We find negative one-year abnormal 
performance for all sub-groups and most of them are statistically significant. Although it 
seems that firms with significantly negative SRARs have more significant negative 
abnormal returns, we can not reject the hypothesis that the difference between the 
average one-year abnormal performance for the sub-sample with the significantly 
negative announcement abnormal return and the sub-sample with statistically 
insignificant announcement abnormal return is equal to zero.  
5.4 Multivariate analysis  
5.4.1 Multiple regression on the determinants of short-run market reaction. 
In this section, we examine LRARs and short term abnormal return as a function 
of variables we are interested in. These variables are motivated by a number of arguments 
presented in the literature and discussed in previous sessions. Although our focus is on 
the determinants on LRARs,  finding variables that have significant impact on the market 
reaction in the short-run might be helpful for us to locate factors that influence the long-
run. 
Table 16 reports cross-sectional regression analysis of the short-term 
announcement  abnormal stock returns to firms which reduced or omitted their cash 
dividend payment.  Since in Panel C of table 8 and in figure 3A, we document that the 
magnitude of short-run market reaction to dividend omissions and reductions is about 3 
percent lower after 1978 than before 1978, we now try to establish some quantitative 
explanations of this diminishing trend. Since Fama and French (2001) document a 
substantial decline in the percentage of firms paying dividends and dramatically 
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shrinking dividend yields, the story behind the shrinking market reaction might be related 
to the fact that perceived benefits of paying dividends are also diminishing. We use the 
percentage of firms paying dividends calculated from table 1 from Baker and Wurgler 
(2003) as a proxy for the benefits of paying dividends, and test its relationship between 
market short-run reaction. In Figure 3B, the percentage of firms paying dividends every 
year is plotted together with the average of percentage of short-run market reaction in the 
corresponding year. The relationship seems apparent: when the percentage of firms 
paying dividends continues to drop across time, the magnitude of market reaction is 
shrinking too.  
In Panel A of table 16 , the dependent variable is the average two-day abnormal 
return in a given year, and independent variable is the percentage of firms paying 
dividend in the corresponding year. To control for possible interaction between the 
percentage of firms paying dividends and variables as size, percentage of dividend 
change, dividend yield and  stock market conditions, the two-day abnormal returns are 
regressed on these variables. Panel B reports the results.  Market condition is a binary 
variable that takes a value of one if the announcement is made during a bull market and 
zero otherwise. Firm size is  measured as of one month before the announcement date. 
The statistical significance of each of the ordinary-least-squares (OLS) parameter 
estimates is tested using the asymptotic t-statistics, which are shown in parentheses. The 
null hypothesis tested is that the OLS parameter estimate is equal to zero.  In panel A, we 
document a strong negative relationship  between the percentage of firms paying 
dividends and the average two-day market reaction to announcement of dividend 
omissions or reductions in the corresponding year. The parameter is 8.29 and significant 
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at 1 percent level, indicating lower percentage of firms paying dividends is associated 
with smaller magnitude of negative market reaction. In panel B, after controlling for 
other factors that might also influence market reaction in the short-run, including 
percentage of dividend change, natural log of firm size, dividend yield and market 
condition, the percentage of firm paying dividend is still negative and statistically 
significant at 1 percent  level. The remaining coefficients generally have signs that are in 
the expected direction and are statistically significant. 
5.4.2 Multiple regression on the determinant of long-run market reaction. 
The univariate results provide evidence that the variables change of risks, reasons 
cited by management, dividend yield, percentage of dividend changes, announcement 
abnormal returns and time periods are not related to long-run post-announcement 
performance following dividend omissions and reductions. To determine whether these 
results still hold in a multivariate setting, long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns are 
regressed on these variables. Since we document no abnormal performance after the first 
year following the announcement for buy-and-hold methodologies,  the dependent 
variable is the first year post-announcement buy-and-hold abnormal return.  
     Table 17 reports the results of the cross-sectional regression analysis of the 
post-announcement first-year (long-term) abnormal stock returns to event firms LTARj 
(which are measured using different reference benchmarks) on several potentially 
influential factors. Two models are specified:   
Model A: LTARj = ϕ0 +ϕ1 PRTCHGj + ϕ2 REASONj + ϕ3 YIELDj + ϕ4 SIZEj + ϕ5 
RISK∆j + ϕ6MARKETj + ϕ7 PERIODj + ϕ8 STARj + εj 
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Model B: LTARj = ϕ0 +ϕ1 PRTCHGj + ϕ2 REASONj + ϕ3 YIELDj + ϕ4 SIZEj + ϕ5 
RISK∆j + ϕ6MARKETj + ϕ7 PERIODj + εj j = 1, ..., N 
where, PRTCHGj is the percentage of dividend change, REASONj is a dummy 
variable which takes a value of 1 when management cite financial loss as the reason for 
dividend changes, 0 when no reason is cited and +1 when investment opportunity is cited. 
YIELDj  is the ratio of the dollar amount of dividend per share for the year before the 
announcement divided by the share price one month before the announcement; SIZEj is 
the natural logarithm of the market value of the event firm j as of one month before the 
announcement date; RISK∆j is the percentage change in the contemporaneous risk of 
event firm j which is measured by the beta coefficient from the market model; MARKETj 
is a binary variable which takes a value of one if the announcement is made during a bull 
market and zero otherwise; PERIODj is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1  if 
the announcement is made in the period from 1963 through 1972, 0 for the period from 
1973 through 1985, and +1 from 1986 through 1995, and  STARj is the standardized two-
day announcement period (short-term) abnormal stock return for event firm j. The 
statistical significance of each of the ordinary-least-squares (OLS) parameter estimates is 
tested using the asymptotic t-statistics, which are shown in parentheses. The null 
hypothesis tested is that the OLS parameter estimate is equal to zero.  The difference 
between model A and model B is that model B excludes STARj as a independent variable. 
Model B is motivated by the fact documented earlier in this paper  that STARj is related 
with most of the independent variables.  
The results from the multivariate regression are similar to the conclusions from 
the univariate analysis discussed earlier. Most of the variables are not statistically 
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significant except SIZE variable. The regression results show that the coefficients to the  
natural logarithm of firm size are positive for all matching criteria and statistically 
significant except matching by equally weighted CRSP index and matching by industry 
and prior performance, indicating that small size firms might be more subject to 
investment biases following announcement of dividend policy changes. One 
interpretation is that large firms are followed by more analysts and hold more by 
institutional investors, they may have fewer information asymmetry problems and the 
markets reaction to corporate events might be more efficient compared with reaction to 
events of small firms. However, this interpretation does not predict direction of LRARs 
for small size firms and can not fully explain the small size phenomena. Fama (1998) 
presents another explanation that many long-run anomalies are concentrated on small size 
firms just because current asset pricing models work poorly when explaining small stocks 
returns. Since we are not using any normative asset pricing modeling in matching, and we 
have already matched by size, this argument also can not fully account for the size effect. 
There is, however, another explanation suggested by Loughran and Ritter (2000). They 
argue that the misevaluations due to cognitive biases are more easily traded away for big 
stocks than for small stocks. Small-cap stocks usually have wider percentage of bid-ask 
spreads than do large-cap stocks. Also, trading on a small stock will easily affect its price 
than on a big stock. As a result, the ability to capitalize on the same percentage of 
misevaluation for a small stock will be less than for a big stock. Abnormal returns, on 
average should be more pronounced for small stocks than for big stocks. 
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5.5 Conclusions 
In essay two, we examine the robustness of long-run negative price drift 
following the announcement of dividend omissions and reductions across different time 
periods. It is motivated by Fama (1998) critique of Michaely et al. (1995)  work that 
their results concerning the long-run price drift following dividend changes are sensitive 
to sub-periods. The paper is to answer Famas call for an out-of-sample test before 
drawing any  inferences about long-term returns following changes in dividends.  We 
examine various sub-periods to test the robustness of long-run negative price drop. We 
begin by splitting the whole sampling period from 1963 through 1995  into eleven 
consecutive sub-periods, with each sub-period including three consecutive years. Most  
sub-periods show negative one-year post-announcement abnormal performance and 
statistically significant. Although the average LRARs in some sub-periods are 
insignificantly negative or positive, no sub-periods exhibit significantly positive 
abnormal long-run post-announcement stock performance. We also split the whole 
sample periods into decades, or by every five years. The results, although not reported, 
are similar.  The result is supported by Fama-French calendar time portfolio regression. 
Eight out of eleven sub-periods show negative long-run abnormal postannouncement 
performance for OLS regression and nine out of eleven sub-periods show negative  long-
run abnormal postannouncement performance for WLS regression. We conclude that the 
underreaction to the announcement of dividend omissions or reductions is persistent 
across time periods. We then examine the price drift by sub-samples defined by bear and 
bull markets. No matter whether the announcement is made in bear or bull market, we 
document negative one-year abnormal performance, significant at 1 percent level for all 
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matching criteria. We also find that despite the trend that the percentage of firms paying 
dividends are dramatically reduced over years, the long-run negative abnormal price drift 
persists.  
This paper also documents that the magnitude of the short-run market reaction to 
dividend omissions and reductions is about 3 percent lower after 1978 than before 1978. 
Using univariate and multivariate analysis, we show that the reduced short-run reaction 
could be attributed to the trend that the percentage of firms paying dividends are 
dramatically reduced over years, indicating that the perceived benefits of paying 
dividends have become smaller and the perceived impact of stop paying dividends or 
cutting dividends has also become smaller in the short-run. We find the short-run market 
reaction is more pronounced in bear market than in bull market. We also confirm findings 
by earlier literature that short-run market reaction is predictable by variables percentage 
of dividend change, reasons cited by management, dividend yield, and firm size.  
However, those patterns in the short-run are not inherited in the long-run. The 
magnitude of long-run price drop does not change over time. The long-run negative 
abnormal returns are not associated with changes in contemporaneous risk, the 
percentage of dividend changes, the reason for the change or  dividend yield. It is also not 
predictable by  the short-run market reaction. The only variable that seems to have 
predicable power in the long-run is firms size. The regression results show that the 
coefficients to the  natural logarithm of firm size is positive for most matching criteria 
and statistically significant, indicating that small size firms might be more subject to 
investment biases following announcement of dividend policy changes.  
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Appendix A: Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Literature Review 
 
Panel A:  Summary of methodologies in long-run study  
                                Calculating Abnormal return for the whole sample   
Expected return   CAR HPAR Rolling Portfolio
  Market model 
Kothari and 
Warner (1996)     
Time-series approach CAPM model 
Merger: Agrawal 
et al. (1992)   
  FF model 
Kothari and 
Warner (1996)     
Cross-sectional 
approach I (Reference 
Portfolio) 
Equal-weighted 
market index 
SEOs:Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves 
(1995) 
IPOs and SEOs: 
Loughran and Ritter 
(1995)   
 
Size decile portfolio
 
Dividend initiation 
and omission: 
Michaely et al. (1995)  
  
Size/Book-to-
market decile 
portfolio   
Splits:Ikenberry et al. 
(1996)   
  
Size-matched Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves 
(1995) 
Loughran and Ritter 
(1995)   
Cross-sectional 
approach II (Matching 
firms) 
Size/industry-
matched 
Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves 
(1995) 
Spiess and Affleck-
Graves (1995)  
 
Size/book-to-market Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves 
(1995) 
Spiess and Affleck-
Graves (1995)  
 
Size/prior 
performance- 
matched 
  
Dividend 
initiation and 
resumption: 
Boehme and 
Sorescu (2002) 
  Market model   Not applicable   
In sample regression CAPM model  Not applicable  
  
Fama-French  
model 
Loughran and 
Ritter (1995) Not applicable 
Boehme and 
Sorescu (2002) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Panel B: Summary of Matching Methodologies used by previous studies Analyzing 
Long-run Stock Return Following Major Corporate Events 
Authors Corporate event Bench mark 
Agrawal et al. (1992) merger Size portfolio 
Ikenberry and 
Lakonishok (1993) 
Proxy contest Market model(CAR) 
Size and risk(Beta) 
RATS(return across time and 
security) 
Michaely, Thaler and 
Womack (1995) 
Dividend initiation and 
omission 
Market adjusted 
Beta adjusted 
Size-decile adjusted 
Size/industry matched portfolio 
Loughran and Ritter 
(1995) 
IPOs 
SEOs 
Market index 
Size control firm 
Three factor model 
Spiess and Affleck-
Graves (1995) 
SEOs Market index 
Size  
Size/industry 
Size/book-to-market 
Dharan and Ikenberry 
(1995) 
New exchange listing Size portfolio 
Ikenberry et al. (1995) Share repurchase Market index 
Size portfolio 
Size/book-to-market portfolio 
Ikenberry et al. (1996) splits Size/book-to-market deciles 
portfolio 
Desai and Jain (1997) Splits and reverse splits Size, book-to market and prior 
performance portfolio 
Benartzi et al. (1997) Dividend  increases and 
decreases 
Size deciles portfolio 
Siew et al. (1998) SEOs Market-adjusted 
Fama-French adjusted 
Spiess and Graves 
(1999)     
Debt offering Size/book-to-market 
 
Eckobo, Masulis and 
Norli (2000)  
Seasoned public offering( 
equity and debt ) 
Size 
Size/book-to-market 
 
Boehme and Sorescu 
(2002) 
Dividend initiation and 
resumption 
 
Three factor model 
Mean monthly calendar time 
abnormal returns 
This paper Dividend omissions and 
reductions 
Market index 
Size, Size/Industry, 
Size/Performance, 
Industry/Performance 
Size/Industry/Performance 
Size/Book-to-market ratio 
Size/Leverage 
  
85
Table 2: Chronological Distribution and Industry Representation  
 
The sample of cash dividend reductions and omissions consists of 1326 non-contaminated initial  Wall Street Journal 
announcements made in the period 1963 through 1995 by NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ listed firms from non-
regulated industries with sufficient data on the CRSP tape. This sample excludes dividend omissions following 
dividend reductions in the earlier quarter and announcements of stock dividends in lieu of cash dividends. All the cash 
dividend reduction or omission announcements in the sample are either the first in the companys history or after a 
continuous payment of at least five years. None of the sample announcements pertains to an American depository 
receipt, or to a Canadian company, or to a firm undergoing liquidation or a merger. 
 
Panel A: Chronological distribution of the sample 
Year 
Number of 
events 
Percent of 
sample (%)  Year 
Number of 
events 
Percent of 
sample (%)  Year 
Number of 
events 
Percent of 
sample (%)
1963 16 1.2 1974 46 3.5 1985 30 2.3 
1964 28 2.1 1975 73 5.5 1986 34 2.6 
1965 20 1.5 1976 18 1.4 1987 17 1.3 
1966 30 2.3 1977 30 2.3 1988 20 1.5 
1967 30 2.3 1978 20 1.5 1989 21 1.6 
1968 32 2.4 1979 39 2.9 1990 37 2.8 
1969 53 4.0 1980 71 5.4 1991 52 3.9 
1970 139 10.5 1981 46 3.5 1992 36 2.7 
1971 96 7.2 1982 126 9.5 1993 16 1.2 
1972 35 2.6 1983 43 3.2 1994 4 0.3 
1973 26 2.0  1984 31 2.3  1995 11 0.8 
Total for all years 1326 100.0% 
 
 
 
Panel B: Industry representation of the sample  
Industry  
Standard Industry 
Classification codes Number of events Percent of sample (%) 
Mining  1000 - 1499 78 5.9 
Construction  1500 - 1999 29 2.2 
Manufacturing  2000 - 3999 932 70.3 
Transportation  4000 - 4999 67 5.1 
Wholesale trade 5000 - 5199 44 3.3 
Retail trade 5200 - 5999 106 8 
Services  7000 - 8999 70 5.3 
Total   1326 100 
 
 
 
Panel C: Frenquency distribution of number of dividend announcements per four-digit SIC industry
Events in a 4-digit SIC code 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 16 17 19 20 23 24 26 37 
# of 4-digit SIC codes 185 85 32 29 26 17 10 5 9 4 3 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 
% of represented industries 14.0 12.87.28.79.87.75.33.06.13.02.50.91.02.41.3 1.4 4.5 1.7 1.82.0 2.8 
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Table 3: Mean Values of Matching Criteria for Event Firms and Matched Firms 
 
Matching firms are selected using the following  sets of matching criteria: (1) size (which is measured by the market 
value of the event firm as of one month before the announcement date and obtained from the CRSP database); (2) size 
and industry (which is determined by the two-digit Standard Industry Classification code of the event firm as indicated 
in the CRSP database); (3) size and prior common stock performance (which is measured over one year before the 
dividend change announcement using the CRSP database); (4) industry and prior common stock performance; (5) size, 
industry, and prior common stock performance; (6) size and the ratio of book to market value (which is measured as of 
the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement date using the COMPUSTAT database); and (7) size and leverage 
(which is measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets as of the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement 
date using the COMPUSTAT database). The matching firms did not omit or cut their dividend during the period from 
five years before to five years after the event announcement date.  
 
Mean values of matching criteria  
Matching     
criteria 
# of 
observations Group of firms Size       ($ million)
Prior  stock 
performance (%) 
Ratio of  
book-to- 
market value 
Leverage
Event  firms 238.72 -24.07 1.19 29.41 Size 1326 
Matched firms 223.44 13.62 0.84 25.96 
Event  firms 245.16 -24.73 1.16 29.56 Size and 
industry 1325 Matched firms 211.21 9.92 0.83 26.20 
Event  firms 246.21 -24.15 1.16 29.47 Size and prior 
performance 1308 Matched firms 213.10 -23.72 0.83 26.71 
Event  firms 239.41 -24.91 1.14 29.50 Industry and 
prior 
performance 
1309 
Matched firms 415.11 -23.07 1.00 27.94 
Event  firms 243.65 -24.26 1.15 29.40 Size, industry 
and prior 
performance 
1297 
Matched firms 219.88 -16.45 0.90 28.22 
Event  firms 415.70 -21.01 1.15 29.33 Size and ratio 
of book-to-
market value 
517 
Matched firms 396.81 18.93 1.16 25.81 
Event  firms 444.22 -20.58 1.12 29.75 Size and 
leverage 509 Matched firms 412.22 19.86 0.83 30.16 
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Table 4: Announcement Abnormal Returns and Post-Announcement Risk Changes  
 
The sample of cash dividend reductions and omissions consists of 1326 announcements. Panel A reports the average 
cumulative abnormal common stock returns over various periods for the companies which reduced or omitted their 
cash dividend payment. Abnormal returns are computed as the prediction error εjt in the market model:  Rjt  =  αj  +  βj 
Rmt  + εjt    where Rjt  and Rmt are respectively the continuously compounded rates of return to stock j and the equally-
weighted CRSP index over day t, and αj and βj are ordinary-least-squares (OLS) estimates. The estimation period is 
day -180 through day -31 relative to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) announcement date. The statistical significance of 
each of the average cumulative abnormal common stock returns is determined using the parametric t-test, based on the 
cross-sectional standard deviations of the abnormal returns. The null hypothesis tested is that the average cumulative 
abnormal common stock return equals zero. Panel B examines whether there is a contemporaneous risk change for the 
dividend reducing or omitting firms. It reports the results of the parametric t-test for the paired comparisons of the 
(OLS) beta coefficients prior versus post the announcement, assuming unequal variances (the results are the same 
assuming equal variances). The null hypothesis tested is that the mean difference between the beta coefficients prior to 
the announcement and the post-announcement beta coefficients equals zero.  The post-announcement beta coefficients 
are estimated using the above market model over the period day +31 through day +180 relative to the WSJ 
announcement date. *** ,** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Panel A: Average cumulative abnormal common stock returns  
Period relative to 
the WSJ 
announcement date   
Average  cumulative 
abnormal common 
stock return (%)   t-statistic   
Percent of negative 
abnormal common 
stock returns (%) 
[-30,-2]  -2.01  -5.05***  56.8 
[-20,-2]  -1.53  -4.81***  57.9 
[-10,-2]  -0.83  -3.47***  56 
[-1,0]  -6.62  -32.87***  84.5 
[1,10]  0.39  1.56  50.6 
[1,20]  1.25  3.76***  47.1 
[1,30]   2.38   5.91***   44.3 
 
Panel B: Test of  of  contemporaneous  risk change  
Prior-announcement mean 
beta   
Post-announcement 
mean beta  
Mean 
difference  t-statistic   N 
1.02   1.12  0.1  5.15***   1323 
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Table 5: Post-Announcement Long-run Abnormal Returns   
This table reports the average long-term (buy-and-hold) abnormal common stock returns over holding periods that 
extend from one to five years following the announcement of cash dividend reductions or omissions. We calculate the 
abnormal return for each omitting and reducing firm as: )1()1(),,( +∏=
−+∏
=
= mtR
b
at
b
at it
RbaiER  where  ER(i,a,b) = 
Excess return for firm i over  the time period from day a to day b, itR = the return on the common share of event firm i 
on day t, Rmt  is either the return on a reference portfolio (the CRSP equally-weighted index) or a matching firm on day 
t. Matching firms are selected using the following  sets of matching criteria: (1) size (which is measured by the market 
value of the event firm as of one month before the announcement date and obtained from the CRSP database); (2) size 
and industry (which is determined by the two-digit Standard Industry Classification code of the event firm as indicated 
in the CRSP database); (3) size and prior common stock performance (which is measured over one year before the 
dividend change announcement using the CRSP database); (4) industry and prior common stock performance; (5) size, 
industry, and prior common stock performance; (6) size and the ratio of book to market value (which is measured as of 
the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement date using the COMPUSTAT database); and (7) size and leverage 
(which is measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets as of the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement 
date using the COMPUSTAT database). The matching firms did not omit or cut their dividend during the period from 
five years before to five years after the event announcement date. The post-announcement long-term abnormal stock 
returns do not include the short-term abnormal stock returns over the period [-1,0] relative to the Wall Street Journal 
announcement date. The statistical significance of each of the average long-term abnormal common stock returns is 
tested using the parametric t-test, based on the cross-sectional standard deviations of the abnormal returns. The null 
hypothesis tested is that the average long-term abnormal common stock return is equal to zero. The sampling period is 
from 1963 to 1995 except for (6), and (7).  The sampling period for matching by size and book-to-market ratio and 
matching by size and leverage is from 1980 to 1995. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
Buy-and-hold period Reference 
benchmark 
Number of 
observations Statistic 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
  Aabnormal return (%) -13.05 -17.95 -25.59 -36.54 -53.11 
1326 t-statistic -9.49*** -5.71*** -7.11*** -7.70*** -8.03***
CRSP 
equally 
weighted 
index   % of negative abnormal returns 67.6 67.0 66.0 66.6 66.3 
  Aabnormal return (%) -14.63 -17.23 -24.50 -25.07 -27.81 
1326 t-statistic -6.00*** -4.24*** -4.30*** -3.91*** -3.30***Size 
  % of negative abnormal returns 55.7 54.3 53.4 52.9 52.0 
  Aabnormal return (%) -10.70 -13.00 -20.07 -21.40 -21.95 
1325 t-statistic -5.34*** -3.39*** -4.06*** -3.30*** -2.75***Size and industry 
  % of negative abnormal returns 54.9 53.0 52.6 52.5 54.0 
  Aabnormal return (%) -10.34 -13.86 -16.28 -19.10 -25.74 
1308 t-statistic -4.53*** -3.60*** -3.26*** -3.14*** -2.73***
Size and 
prior  
performance   % of negative abnormal returns 53.0 53.1 51.1 52.4 51.5 
  Aabnormal return (%) -9.13 -9.19 -17.62 -26.98 -25.92 
1309 t-statistic -4.43*** -2.59*** -3.63*** -3.79*** -2.99***
Industry and 
prior 
performance   % of negative abnormal returns 52.5 50.5 49.7 50.0 49.0 
  Aabnormal return (%) -7.31 -9.83 -14.09 -19.85 -28.80 
1297 t-statistic -3.57*** -2.45** -2.95*** -3.24*** -3.26***
Size, 
industry and 
prior 
performance   % of negative abnormal returns 54.3 52.6 53.3 53.1 52.9 
 Aabnormal return (%) -13.32 -24.16 -43.91 -55.36 -75.37 
517 t-statistic -4.33*** -4.98*** -5.52*** -5.32*** -5.49***
Size and  
book-to-
market 
value  % of negative abnormal returns 60 63.4 61.7 60.7 58.9 
  Aabnormal return (%) -17.29 -22.28 -30.49 -33.72 -35.84 
509 t-statistic -4.39*** -4.18*** -4.05*** -3.81*** -3.19***Size and leverage 
  % of negative abnormal returns 59.9 56.8 55.6 54.2 55.8 
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Table 6: Duration of  Post-Announcement Long-run Abnormal Returns  
 
This table examines the duration of the long-term abnormal common stock returns. It reports the average (buy-and-
hold) abnormal common stock returns for each year during the five-year period following the announcement of cash 
dividend reductions or omissions. The reason for this examination is the argument of Mitchell and Stafford (1997) and 
Fama (1998) that buy-and-hold abnormal returns can give false impressions of the speed of price adjustment to an 
event, because they can grow with the return horizon even when there is no abnormal return after the first period. We 
calculate the abnormal return for each omitting and reducing firm as: )1()1(),,( +∏=
−+∏
=
= mtR
b
at
b
at it
RbaiER  where  
ER(i,a,b) = Excess return for firm i over  the time period from day a to day b, itR = the return on the common share of 
event firm i on day t, Rmt  is either the return on a reference portfolio (the CRSP equally-weighted index) or a matching 
firm on day t. Matching firms are selected using the same sets of matching criteria as in table 5. The matching firms did 
not omit or cut their dividend during the period from five years before to five years after the event announcement date. 
The post-announcement annual abnormal stock returns do not include the short-term abnormal stock returns over the 
period [-1,0] relative to the Wall Street Journal announcement date. The statistical significance of each of the average 
annual abnormal common stock returns is tested using the parametric t-test, based on the cross-sectional standard 
deviations of the abnormal returns. The null hypothesis tested is that the average annual abnormal common stock return 
is equal to zero. The sampling period is from 1963 to 1995 except for (6), and (7).  The sampling period for matching 
by size and book-to-market ratio and matching by size and leverage is from 1980 to 1995.***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.  
 
Post-announcement buy-and-hold year Reference 
benchmark 
Number of 
observations Statistic 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year
  Aabnormal return (%) -13.05 -1.92 -0.68 -1.84 -0.71 
1326 t-statistic -9.49*** -1.25 -0.45 -1.14 -0.45 CRSP equally weighted index 
  % of negative abnormal returns 67.6 58.1 55.1 52.8 48.6 
  Aabnormal return (%) -14.63 -0.07 0.77 1.98 -9.12 
1326 t-statistic -6.00*** -0.03 0.42 1.08 -0.81 Size 
  % of negative abnormal returns 55.7 50.3 49.6 50.6 47.9 
  Aabnormal return (%) -10.7 -0.04 -1.01 0.4 1.89 
1325 t-statistic -5.34*** -0.02 -0.55 0.22 1.02 Size and industry 
  % of negative abnormal returns 54.9 50.7 51.8 51.9 48.6 
  Aabnormal return (%) -10.34 -0.93 0.49 -0.19 0.56 
1308 t-statistic -4.53*** -0.46 0.24 -0.1 0.29 Size and prior  performance 
  % of negative abnormal returns 53 49.6 47.9 48.7 49.2 
  Aabnormal return (%) -9.13 0.69 -1.55 -2.28 2.51 
1309 t-statistic -4.43*** 0.34 -0.72 -1.07 1.29 
Industry and 
prior 
performance   % of negative abnormal returns 52.5 48.1 51 51.5 47.5 
  Aabnormal return (%) -7.31 0.09 -1.05 -0.09 -1.13 
1297 t-statistic -3.57*** 0.05 -0.56 -0.05 -0.55 
Size, industry 
and prior 
performance   % of negative abnormal returns 54.3 51.1 52.5 51.4 49 
 Aabnormal return (%) -13.32 -8.57 -7.05 -2.74 -0.44 
517 t-statistic -4.33*** -3.12*** -2.25** -0.99 -0.16 
Size and  book-
to-market value 
 % of negative abnormal returns 60 58.2 57.1 52.8 50.4 
  Aabnormal return (%) -17.29 -3.03 -1.24 -0.36 2.75 
509 t-statistic -4.39*** -1.08 -0.37 -0.13 0.99 Size and leverage 
  % of negative abnormal returns 59.9 51.3 51.2 53.3 48.4 
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Table 7: Post-Announcement Monthly Abnormal Returns  
 
This table reports the post-announcement average monthly abnormal stock returns for event firms, which are estimated 
using the Fama-French calendar time portfolio regressions. The reason for using this method is to overcome any 
possible statistical problems associated with using long-term buy-and-hold returns. In Panel A, abnormal returns are 
estimated for the one-, two-, three-, four- and five-year post announcement horizon. For every calendar month, the 
equally-weighted return on the portfolio, which contains all firms which reduced or omitted their cash dividend 
payment during the preceding 12, 24, 36, 48, or 60 calendar months, is estimated. Then, the equally weighted calendar 
time event portfolio returns are used  in the following three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) to estimate the 
portfolio's abnormal returns: 
Rp,t  Rf,t =  αp +  βp (Rm,t  Rf,t) +  sp SMBt +   hp  HMLt +   ep,t 
Where R p,t represents the return of calendar time portfolio in month t,  and R f,t is the one-month Treasury bill rate. The 
three independent variables are Fama-French three factors in each month. Market factor is the return on a value-
weighted market index minus risk free rate. Size factor is the return on a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks less 
the return on a value-weighted portfolio of big stocks. Book-to-market factor is the return on a value-weighted portfolio 
of high book-to-market stocks less the return on a  value-weighted portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. The 
intercept αp  is then interpreted as the average monthly abnormal return of the event portfolio across all 12, 24, 36, 48, 
or 60 months, as corresponds to the rolling portfolio. In Panel B, the post-announcement monthly average abnormal 
stock returns are estimated separately for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th post event year to determine the duration of the 
announcements' effect. Equally weighted calendar time portfolio returns are computed each month for all firms 
reducing or omitting their dividend in the previous 1 to 12, 13 to 24, 25 to 36, 37 to 48, and 49 to 60 calendar months. 
Since the number of dividend reducing or omitting firms included in the rolling event portfolio changes through time, 
both ordinary-least-squares (OLS) and weighted-least-squares (WLS) estimates of the intercept αp (i.e. the average 
monthly abnormal return) are provided below. The weights used in the WLS model are equal to the number of event 
firms in the monthly portfolio. The sampling period is from 1963 to 1995. The statistical significance of each of the 
average monthly abnormal common stock returns is tested using the parametric t-test, which are calculated using the 
method of White (1980). The null hypothesis tested is that the average monthly abnormal common stock return αp is 
equal to zero. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
 
  Panel A: Post Announcement Monthly Abnormal Returns  
 Period 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 
Intercept (%) -0.74 -0.46 -0.33 -0.34 -0.33 OLS 
t-statistic -4.19*** -2.97*** -2.28** -2.28** -2.33** 
Intercept (%) -0.66 -0.38 -0.25 -0.17 -0.09 WLS 
t-statistic -4.37*** -2.94*** -2.15* -1.63 -0.95 
  Number of observations (months) 390 390 390 390 390 
       
  Panel B: Duration of long-run abnormal returns 
 Period 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year
Intercept (%) -0.74 -0.12 0.10 0.02 0.03 OLS 
t-statistic -4.19*** -0.62 0.53 0.08 0.17 
Intercept (%) -0.66 -0.09 0.05 0.08 0.23 WLS 
t-statistic -4.37*** -0.60 0.32 0.45 1.49 
  Number of observations (months) 390 390 390 390 390 
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Table 9: Abnormal Returns  by the Condition of the Stock Market 
 
In this table, the post-announcement first-year long-term average abnormal common stock returns and the 
announcement period short-term average abnormal common stock return, for the sub-sample of dividend event firms 
that made their announcements during bear markets, are compared to those that made their announcements during bull 
markets. These sub-sample comparisons are motivated by the possibility that investors may react differently in bear 
versus bull stock markets. A month is considered a bear market month if the stock market return during that month is 
lower than the risk-free rate. The monthly stock market returns are measured using the value-weighted CRSP index, 
and the risk-free rate is measured by the rate on the one-month U.S. Treasury bill. An examination of the distribution of 
the difference between the monthly stock market return and the one-month T-bill rate identifies significant clustering in 
two intervals +1% to +5% and -1% to -3%. The statistical significance of each of the average abnormal common stock 
returns is tested using the parametric t-test, based on the cross-sectional standard deviations of the abnormal returns. 
The null hypothesis tested is that the average abnormal common stock return is equal to zero. For sub-sample 
comparisons, the statistical significance of the difference between the average abnormal common stock returns is tested 
using the parametric t-test, assuming unequal variances. The null hypothesis tested is that the difference is equal to 
zero. The results are identical assuming equal variances. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
Reference 
benchmark Statistic Bear market Bull market Difference 
Average abnormal return (%) -12.81 -13.22 0.41 
t-statistic -5.65*** -7.69*** 0.14 
CRSP equally 
weighted index 
Number of observations 543 783   
Average abnormal return (%) -19.90 -10.97 -8.93 
t-statistic -4.23*** -4.34*** -1.67* Size 
Number of observations 543 783   
Average abnormal return (%) -11.40 -10.21 -1.18 
t-statistic -3.43*** -4.09*** -0.28 Size and industry 
Number of observations 543 782   
Average abnormal return (%) -14.51 -7.44 -7.07 
t-statistic -3.75*** -2.68*** -1.49 Size and prior  performance 
Number of observations 536 772   
Average abnormal return (%) -8.91 -9.29 0.39 
t-statistic -2.92*** -3.35*** 0.09 Industry and prior performance 
Number of observations 537 772   
Average abnormal return (%) -8.09 -6.77 -1.31 
t-statistic -2.44*** -2.60*** -0.31 
Size, industry and 
prior performance 
Number of observations 533 764   
Average abnormal return (%) -18.10 -10.20 -7.89 
t-statistic -3.80*** -2.53*** -1.27 Size and  ratio of book-to-market value 
Number of observations 204 313   
Average abnormal return (%) -21.38 -14.58 -6.80 
t-statistic -3.79*** -2.71*** -0.87 Size and leverage 
Number of observations 203 306   
     
Statistic Bear market Bull market Difference 
Average abnormal return (%) -7.11 -6.28 -0.83 
t-statistic -21.57*** -24.86*** -1.99** 
Short-term 
abnormal common 
stock return  over 
days [-1, 0] relative 
to the WSJ 
announcement date Number of observations 543 783   
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Table 10: Abnormal  Returns, by Sub-Samples Defined By Period of Announcement 
 
In this table, the sample of dividend event firms is split into three sub-samples, according to their announcement date. 
The first sub-sample includes companies that made their announcement in the period 1963 through 1972; the second 
sub-sample includes companies that made their announcement in the period 1973 through 1985; and the third sub-
sample includes companies that made their announcement in the period 1986 through 1995. Then, sub-sample 
comparisons are conducted for the long-term average abnormal common stock returns during the 1st year following the 
announcement and for the short-term average abnormal common stock return over days -1 through day 0 relative to the 
Wall Street Journal announcement. These sub-sample comparisons are motivated by the findings of the study by Fama 
and French (2001). This study documents that the average percentage of firms paying dividends is 72% in the period 
1963 through 1972, 57% in the period 1973 through 1985, and falls to 30% in the period 1986 through 1995. The 
statistical significance of each of the average abnormal common stock returns is tested using the parametric t-test, 
based on the cross-sectional standard deviations of the abnormal returns. The null hypothesis tested is that the average 
abnormal common stock return is equal to zero. For sub-sample comparisons, the statistical significance of the 
difference between the average abnormal common stock returns is tested using the parametric t-test, assuming unequal 
variances. The null hypothesis tested is that the difference is equal to zero. The results are identical assuming equal 
variances. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
 
Reference 
benchmark Statistic 
1963 
through 
1972 
1973 
through 
1985 
1986 
through 
1995 
1963-1972 
minus 1986-
1995 
Average abnormal return (%) -6.40 -12.66 -26.86 20.46 
t-statistic -3.00*** -6.18*** -7.92*** 5.33*** CRSP equally weighted index Number of observations 479 599 248   
Average abnormal return (%) -10.05 -17.56 -16.39 6.34 
t-statistic -2.52*** -5.46*** -2.31** 0.84 Size 
Number of observations 479 599 248   
Average abnormal return (%) -5.78 -17.04 -4.88 -0.90 
t-statistic -1.82* -5.36*** -1.16 -0.17 Size and industry 
Number of observations 478 599 248   
Average abnormal return (%) -10.67 -10.71 -8.79 -1.89 
t-statistic -2.62*** -3.40*** -1.61 -0.27 Size and prior  performance Number of observations 464 598 246   
Average abnormal return (%) -2.56 -16.58 -3.46 0.91 
t-statistic -0.92 -4.91*** -0.70 0.17 Industry and prior performance Number of observations 465 598 246   
Average abnormal return (%) -4.53 -10.29 -5.24 0.71 
t-statistic -1.44 -3.17*** -1.15 0.13 Size, industry and prior performance Number of observations 455 596 246   
Average abnormal return (%)   -18.30 -6.54   
t-statistic  -4.64*** -1.34  Size and  ratio of book-to-market value Number of observations   298 219   
Average abnormal return (%)   -19.88 -13.98   
t-statistic  -4.14*** -2.13**  Size and leverage 
Number of observations   286 223   
      
Statistic 
1963 
through 
1972 
1973 
through 
1985 
1986 
through 
1995 
1963-1972 
minus 1986-
1995 
Average abnormal return (%) -7.21 -6.93 -4.76 -2.45 
t-statistic -24.21*** -22.72*** -9.13*** -4.39*** 
Short-term 
abnormal common 
stock return  over 
days [-1, 0] relative 
to the WSJ 
announcement date Number of observations 479 599 248   
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Table 11: Abnormal  Returns, by Sub-Samples Defined by Changes in Risk 
 
In this table, the event firms are classified into four sub-samples, which are defined by the post-announcement change 
in their beta estimates. The first-year long-term average abnormal common stock returns and the announcement period 
short-term average abnormal common stock return, for the sub-sample of event firms whose betas decreased 
significantly (sub-sample 1), are compared to those for event firms whose betas increased significantly (sub-sample 4). 
Similar to the study of Boehme and Sorescu (2002), these sub-sample comparisons are motivated by the possibility that 
the observed statistically significant first-year (long-term) abnormal stock returns are the result of changes in the 
perceived risk and, therefore, the cost of equity of the event firms. The beta estimates prior to the announcements are 
computed using the market model:  Rjt  =  αj  +  βj Rmt  + εjt    where Rjt  and Rmt are respectively the continuously 
compounded rates of return to stock j and the equally-weighted CRSP index over day t, αj and βj are ordinary-least-
squares (OLS) estimates, and  εjt is the error term. The estimation period is day -180 through day -31 relative to the 
Wall Street Journal (WSJ) announcement date. The post-announcement beta coefficients are estimated using the above 
market model over the period day +31 through day +180 relative to the WSJ announcement date. For sub-sample 
comparisons, the statistical significance of the difference between the average abnormal common stock returns is tested 
using the parametric t-test, assuming unequal variances. The null hypothesis tested is that the difference is equal to 
zero. The results are identical assuming equal variances. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
 
Decrease in risk Increase in risk Reference 
benchmark Statistic Lower half 
(1) 
Upper half 
(2) 
Lower half 
(3) 
Upper half 
(4) 
Difference 
between   
(1)  and  
(4) 
Average abnormal return (%) -15.56 -10.28 -14.70 -11.35 -4.215 
t-statistic -4.41*** -4.00*** -6.31*** -4.16*** -0.95 CRSP equally weighted index 
Number of observations 278 278 369 369   
Average abnormal return (%) -14.87 -10.83 -18.20 -10.62 -4.249 
t-statistic -3.18*** -2.52** -3.30*** -2.78*** -0.70 Size 
Number of observations 278 278 369 369   
Average abnormal return (%) -10.72 -3.37 -16.46 -8.99 -1.730 
t-statistic -2.40** -0.78 -4.54*** -2.46** -0.30 Size and industry 
Number of observations 278 278 369 369   
Average abnormal return (%) -14.54 -9.45 -12.00 -7.01 -7.524 
t-statistic -2.66*** -1.93* -2.66*** -1.87* -1.13 Size and prior  performance 
Number of observations 278 278 369 369   
Average abnormal return (%) -15.29 -8.43 -4.66 -9.53 -5.761 
t-statistic -3.07*** -2.00** -1.31 -2.38** -0.90 Industry and prior performance 
Number of observations 278 278 369 369   
Average abnormal return (%) -11.18 -0.74 -13.20 -3.13 -8.049 
t-statistic -2.50** -0.19 -3.04*** -0.86 -1.40 Size, industry and prior performance 
Number of observations 278 278 369 369   
Average abnormal return (%) -14.81 -7.25 -6.47 -21.73 6.92 
t-statistic -2.53*** -1.15 -1.04 -3.56*** 0.82 
Size and  ratio of 
book-to-market 
value Number of observations 126 98 138 151   
Average abnormal return (%) -28.33 -13.65 -11.92 -14.47 -13.86 
t-statistic -2.80*** -1.59 -1.91* -2.09** -1.13 Size and leverage 
Number of observations 122 97 138 148   
Decrease in risk Increase in risk 
Statistic Lower half 
(1) 
Upper half 
(2) 
Lower half 
(3) 
Upper half 
(4) 
Difference 
between   
(1)  and  
(4) 
Average abnormal return (%) -6.49 -6.35 -6.59 -6.93 0.440 
t-statistic -15.13*** -16.57*** -17.43*** -16.10*** 0.72 
Short-term 
abnormal 
common stock 
return  over days 
[-1, 0]  
Number of observations 278 278 369 369   
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Table 12: Abnormal  Returns, by Sub-Samples Defined by Firm Size 
 
In this table, the event firms are classified into four sub-samples, based on their size. Firm size is measured by the 
market value of the firm as of one month before the announcement date using CRSP. The post-announcement first-year 
long-term average abnormal common stock returns and the announcement period short-term average abnormal 
common stock return, for the sub-sample of small-size event firms, are compared to those for large-size event firms. 
This examination of the abnormal returns in relation to firm size is motivated by the argument of Fama (1998) that 
current asset pricing models work poorly when explaining small stocks returns. Also, the empirical findings of Boehme 
and Sorescu (2002) indicate that the long-term price drift following dividend initiations and resumptions is confined to 
the smaller firms. For sub-sample comparisons, the statistical significance of the difference between the average 
abnormal common stock returns is tested using the parametric t-test, assuming unequal variances. The null hypothesis 
tested is that the difference is equal to zero. The results are identical assuming equal variances. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
 
Groupings of  firms by size (from small to large)Reference 
benchmark Statistic 
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 
Difference 
between   
1st  and 4th
Average abnormal return (%) -9.58 -13.48 -14.14 -14.91 5.33 
t-statistic -3.09*** -5.01*** -5.18*** -5.84*** 1.33 CRSP equally weighted index 
Number of observations 324 324 324 325   
Average abnormal return (%) -18.57 -17.35 -9.05 -10.13 -8.44 
t-statistic -3.55*** -2.91*** -2.48** -2.93*** -1.35 Size 
Number of observations 324 324 324 325   
Average abnormal return (%) -14.55 -7.98 -12.64 -6.36 -8.19 
t-statistic -3.04*** -2.09** -3.36*** -1.87* -1.39 Size and industry 
Number of observations 324 324 324 325   
Average abnormal return (%) -19.95 -13.78 -8.30 -0.51 -19.44 
t-statistic -3.41*** -2.93*** -2.12** -0.15 -2.85***Size and prior  performance 
Number of observations 324 324 324 325   
Average abnormal return (%) -4.61 -9.42 -13.53 -9.35 4.75 
t-statistic -1.09 -2.27** -3.16*** -2.37** 0.82 
Industry and 
prior 
performance Number of observations 324 324 324 325   
Average abnormal return (%) -12.40 -7.16 -7.91 -1.80 -10.59 
t-statistic -2.29** -1.82* -2.16** -0.60 -1.71* 
Size, industry 
and prior 
performance Number of observations 324 324 324 325   
Average abnormal return (%) -24.04 -16.00 -14.64 -6.97 -17.07 
t-statistic -2.19** -2.83*** -2.29** -1.55 -1.44 
Size and  ratio 
of book-to-
market value Number of observations 62 116 154 182   
Average abnormal return (%) -27.31 -30.36 -19.90 -3.69 -23.61 
t-statistic -2.02** -3.68*** -2.22** -0.84 -1.66 Size and leverage 
Number of observations 59 112 151 184   
       
Groupings of  firms by size (from small to large)
Statistic 
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 
Difference 
between   
1st  and 4th
Average abnormal return (%) -6.87 -7.24 -6.68 -5.64 -1.23 
t-statistic -17.11*** -17.30*** -17.13*** -13.41*** -2.11** 
Short-term 
abnormal  
return  over 
days [-1, 0] 
relative to the 
WSJ 
announcement 
date Number of observations 324 324 324 325   
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Table 13: Abnormal  Returns, by Sub-Samples Defined by Reasons  
 
In this table, the post-announcement first-year long-term average abnormal common stock returns and the 
announcement period short-term average abnormal common stock return, for the sub-sample of dividend event firms 
that cite investmentoppotunity as reasons for dividend change, are compared to those that cite financial loss as the 
reason. The statistical significance of each of the average abnormal common stock returns is tested using the parametric 
t-test, based on the cross-sectional standard deviations of the abnormal returns. The null hypothesis tested is that the 
average abnormal common stock return is equal to zero. For sub-sample comparisons, the statistical significance of the 
difference between the average abnormal common stock returns is tested using the parametric t-test, assuming unequal 
variances. The null hypothesis tested is that the difference is equal to zero. The results are identical assuming equal 
variances. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
 
Reference 
benchmark Statistic 
Investment 
opportunity
Financial loss Difference 
Average abnormal return (%) -6.19 -13.13 6.93 
t-statistic -1.4 -8.73*** 1.48 CRSP equally weighted index 
Number of observations 106 1144   
Average abnormal return (%) -7.87 -14.73 6.86 
t-statistic -1.37 -5.44*** 1.08 Size 
Number of observations 106 1144   
Average abnormal return (%) -4.07 -11.09 7.03 
t-statistic -0.61 -5.05*** 1.01 Size and industry 
Number of observations 106 1143   
Average abnormal return (%) -3.07 -11.30 8.23 
t-statistic -0.45 -4.48*** 1.14 Size and prior  performance 
Number of observations 104 1129   
Average abnormal return (%) -3.42 -8.44 5.01 
t-statistic -0.43 -3.89*** 0.61 Industry and prior performance 
Number of observations 104 1130   
Average abnormal return (%) -2.32 -7.64 5.32 
t-statistic -0.39 -3.38*** 0.83 Size, industry and prior performance 
Number of observations 103 1119   
Average abnormal return (%) 0.97 -14.87 15.84 
t-statistic 0.11 -4.33*** 1.64 
Size and  ratio of 
book-to-market value 
Number of observations 55 428   
Average abnormal return (%) -5.09 -19.43 14.34 
t-statistic -0.55 -4.25*** 1.4 Size and leverage 
Number of observations 56 419   
     
Statistic Investment opportunity Financial loss Difference 
Average abnormal return (%) -4.32 -6.78 2.47 
t-statistic -6.61*** -31.32*** 3.59*** 
Short-term 
abnormal common 
stock return  over 
days [-1, 0]  
Number of observations 106 1144   
 
 
 
  
98
 
Table 14: Abnormal  Returns, by Sub-Samples Defined by Dividend Yield  
 
In this table, the event firms are classified into four sub-samples based on their dividend yield prior to the dividend 
reduction or omission announcement. The dividend yield is the ratio of the dollar amount of dividend per share for the 
year before the announcement divided by the share price one month before the announcement. The dollar amount of 
dividend per share for the year before announcement is obtained from COMPUSTAT. The share price is obtained from 
the master file of CRSP. The post-announcement first-year abnormal returns and the short-term abnormal stock return 
for the sub-sample of event firms whose dividend yield places them in the bottom quartile are compared to those for the 
sub-sample of event firms in the top quartile. It is expected to find significant sub-sample differences in the case of the 
short-term abnormal returns because of the well documented dividend clientele effect, but in the case of the long-term 
abnormal returns, there is no positive prediction, which is the motivation of this table. For sub-sample comparisons, the 
statistical significance of the difference between the average abnormal common stock returns is tested using the 
parametric t-test, assuming unequal variances. The null hypothesis tested is that the difference is equal to zero. The 
results are identical assuming equal variances. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
Groupings of  firms by dividend yield 
(low to high) Reference 
benchmark Statistic 1st 
quartile 
2nd 
quartile 
3rd 
quartile 
4th 
quartile  
Difference 
between       
1st  and 4th 
Average abnormal return (%) -21.23 -11.78 -12.08 -11.77 -9.46 
t-statistic -6.06*** -4.00*** -4.52*** -3.43*** -1.93* CRSP equally weighted index 
Number of observations 226 226 226 227   
Average abnormal return (%) -22.37 -10.64 -4.88 -14.54 -7.83 
t-statistic -2.96*** -2.59*** -1.20 -2.41** -0.81 Size 
Number of observations 226 226 226 227   
Average abnormal return (%) -11.63 -7.03 -9.41 -7.30 -4.33 
t-statistic -2.40** -1.62 -2.32** -1.75* -0.68 Size and industry 
Number of observations 226 226 226 227   
Average abnormal return (%) -7.65 -10.79 -9.62 -2.64 -5.01 
t-statistic -1.49 -2.07** -2.26** -0.52 -0.69 Size and prior  performance 
Number of observations 226 226 226 227   
Average abnormal return (%) -8.57 -5.15 -12.43 -11.67 3.10 
t-statistic -1.72* -1.23 -2.51** -2.29** 0.43 
Industry and 
prior 
performance Number of observations 226 226 226 227   
Average abnormal return (%) -8.43 -0.59 -4.31 -4.69 -3.74 
t-statistic -2.07** -0.14 -1.04 -1.07 -0.63 
Size, industry 
and prior 
performance Number of observations 226 226 226 227  
Average abnormal return (%) -9.30 -20.46 -7.62 -10.94 1.65 
t-statistic -1.54 -3.00*** -1.11 -1.56 0.18 
Size and  ratio 
of book-to-
market value Number of observations 151 116 73 92   
Average abnormal return (%) -10.65 -15.89 -5.67 -19.84 9.20 
t-statistic -1.80* -2.18** -0.57 -1.76* 0.72 Size and leverage 
Number of observations 151 112 72 97   
       
Groupings of  firms by dividend yield 
(low to high) Statistic 
1st 
quartile 
2nd 
quartile 
3rd 
quartile 
4th 
quartile  
Difference 
between       
1st  and 4th 
Average abnormal return (%) -4.02 -6.11 -7.43 -7.51 3.50 
t-statistic -9.42*** -13.81*** -16.33*** -13.51*** 4.99*** 
Short-term 
abnormal 
common stock 
return  over 
days [-1, 0]  
Number of observations 226 226 226 227   
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Table 15: Abnormal Returns  by Announcement Abnormal Returns  
 
In this table, the event firms are classified into three sub-samples based on whether their announcement period short-
term abnormal common stock return is statistically significantly negative, statistically insignificant, or statistically 
significantly positive. Then, the post-announcement first-year long-term average abnormal common stock returns for 
the sub-sample of event firms whose announcement period short-term abnormal common stock return is statistically 
significantly negative are compared to those for the sub-sample of event firms whose announcement period short-term 
abnormal common stock return is statistically insignificant. The purpose of these sub-sample comparisons is to 
examine the existence of any relations between the short-term and the long-term abnormal returns. The statistical 
significance of each of the post-announcement first-year average abnormal common stock returns is tested using the 
parametric t-test, based on the cross-sectional standard deviations of the abnormal returns. The null hypothesis tested is 
that the average abnormal common stock return is equal to zero. For sub-sample comparisons, the statistical 
significance of the difference between the average abnormal common stock returns is tested using the parametric t-test, 
assuming unequal variances. The null hypothesis tested is that the difference is equal to zero. The results are identical 
assuming equal variances. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively, in a two-
tailed test. 
 
Announcement period abnormal 
return Reference 
benchmark Statistic Significantlynegative    
(1) 
Statistically 
insignificant 
(2)    
Significantly 
positive     
(3) 
Difference 
between     
(1) and (2) 
Average abnormal return (%) -14.44 -11.39 -16.66 -3.05 
t-statistic -8.57*** -5.07*** -1.94* -1.08 CRSP equally weighted index 
Number of observations 670 626 30   
Average abnormal return (%) -13.08 -16.16 -17.35 3.08 
t-statistic -4.69*** -3.88*** -1.19 0.61 Size 
Number of observations 670 626 30   
Average abnormal return (%) -13.59 -7.20 -18.97 -6.38 
t-statistic -5.08*** -2.33** -1.73* 1.56 Size and industry 
Number of observations 670 625 30   
Average abnormal return (%) -9.56 -10.58 -22.93 1.02 
t-statistic -3.28*** -2.90*** -1.80* 0.22 Size and prior  performance 
Number of observations 660 619 29   
Average abnormal return (%) -12.18 -6.53 5.07 -5.65 
t-statistic -4.77*** -1.96** 0.38 1.34 Industry and prior performance 
Number of observations 662 618 29   
Average abnormal return (%) -9.60 -4.00 -26.04 -5.61 
t-statistic -3.86*** -1.19 -1.99** 1.34 Size, industry and prior performance
Number of observations 653 615 29   
Average abnormal return (%) -12.39 -12.86 -32.62 0.47 
t-statistic -2.85*** -3.00*** -1.37 0.08 
Size and  ratio of 
book-to-market 
value Number of observations 209 291 17   
Average abnormal return (%) -17.45 -16.31 -31.72 -1.14 
t-statistic -2.53*** -3.39*** -1.76* -0.14 Size and leverage 
Number of observations 208 284 17   
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Table 16: Regression Analysis of the Announcement  Abnormal  Returns 
 
Panel A reports the results of the cross-sectional regression analysis of the average 2-day announcement abnormal 
stock returns to event firms on the percentage of firms paying dividends in each year. Panel B reports the results of the 
cross-sectional regression analysis of the firm specific 2-day announcement abnormal common stock returns to event 
firms on several potentially influential factors. Percentage of firms paying dividends is calculated from table 1 of Baker 
and Wurgler (2003) as a proxy for the benefits of paying dividends. Firm size is  measured as of one month before the 
announcement date. Dividend Yield is the ratio of the dollar amount of dividend per share for the year before the 
announcement divided by the share price one month before the announcement. Market condition is a binary variable 
which takes a value of one if the announcement is made during a bull market and zero otherwise. The statistical 
significance of each of the ordinary-least-squares (OLS) parameter estimates is tested using the asymptotic t-statistics, 
which are shown in parentheses. The null hypothesis tested is that the OLS parameter estimate is equal to zero. N is the 
number of observations. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively, in a two-
tailed test. 
 
 
 
Panel A 
Dependent Variable Constant 
Percentage of firms 
paying dividends 
R2  (%) F N 
-2.05 -8.29 42.82 23.21*** 33 Average short-term 
abnormal return in a year -2.11** -4.82***       
 
 
Panel B 
Dependent 
Variable Models Intercept 
percentage 
of firms 
paying 
dividends
Percentage 
of dividend 
change 
Natural 
log of 
firm 
size 
Dividend 
yield 
Market 
condition 
dummy 
R2  
(%) F N 
2.34 -10.11 0.04 -0.05 -0.24 0.54 6.59 12.81*** 914Model 
1 1.83* -5.76*** 4.14*** -0.32 -4.24*** 1.13       
-3.32  0.02 0.28 -0.26 0.60 3.17 7.45*** 914Model 
2 -4.00***  1.87* 1.99** -4.58*** 1.23       
-2.25 -7.79         2.54 34.44*** 1326
Short-term 
abnormal 
stock 
return  
over days 
[-1, 0]  
Model 
3 -2.92*** -5.87***               
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Table 17: Regression Analysis of the Post-Announcement Abnormal  Returns  
This table reports the results of the cross-sectional regression analysis of the post-announcement first-year (long-term) abnormal 
stock returns to event firms LTARj (which are measured using different reference benchmarks) on several potentially influential 
factors. Two models are specified:  
Model A: LTARj = ϕ0 +ϕ1 PRTCHGj + ϕ2 REASONj + ϕ3 YIELDj + ϕ4 SIZEj + ϕ5 RISK∆j + ϕ6MARKETj + ϕ7 PERIODj + ϕ8 
STARj + εj 
Model B: LTARj = ϕ0 +ϕ1 PRTCHGj + ϕ2 REASONj + ϕ3 YIELDj + ϕ4 SIZEj + ϕ5 RISK∆j + ϕ6MARKETj + ϕ7 PERIODj + εj
 j = 1, ..., N 
where, PRTCHGj is the percentage of dividend change, REASONj is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 when 
management cite financial loss as the reason for dividend changes, 0 when no reason is cited and +1 when investment opportunity 
is cited; YIELDj  is the ratio of the dollar amount of dividend per share for the year before the announcement divided by the share 
price one month before the announcement; SIZEj is the natural logarithm of the market value of the event firm j as of one month 
before the announcement date; RISK∆j is the percentage change in the contemporaneous risk of event firm j which is measured by 
the beta coefficient from the market model; MARKETj is a binary variable which takes a value of one if the announcement is made 
during a bull market and zero during a bear market; PERIODj is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1  if the announcement 
is made in the period from 1963 through 1972, 0 from 1973 through 1985, and +1 from 1986 through 1995, and  STARj is the 
standardized two-day announcement period abnormal stock return for event firm j.  
Ordinary-least-sqaures estimates for   Reference 
benchmark  
Model 
# j0  PRTCHG REASON YIELD SIZE RISKD MARKET PERIOD SRAR 
R2  
(%) F N 
-0.96 0.11 3.38 0.17 0.67 0.16 0.23 -5.90 0.99 3.81 4.42*** 9031A 
-0.16 1.72* 1.4 0.44 0.68 0.78 0.07 -2.87*** 1.67*       
-2.78 0.11 3.73 0.09 0.59 0.17 0.59 -5.29  3.40 4.49*** 903
CRSP 
equally 
weighted 
index 1B -0.49 1.79* 1.55 0.24 0.59 0.82 0.18 -2.62***         
10.36 0.16 1.60 -0.72 4.58 0.44 10.13 -5.84 0.45 2.09 2.38** 9032A 
0.99 1.44 0.37 -1.06 2.58*** 1.2 1.75* -1.59 0.43       
9.53 0.16 1.76 -0.76 4.55 0.44 10.29 -5.56   2.07 2.70*** 903
Size 
2B 
0.93 1.46 0.41 -1.12 2.56*** 1.21 1.78* -1.54         
14.07 0.23 0.46 -0.19 2.44 -0.10 3.79 -1.78 1.31 1.92 2.19** 9033A 
1.75* 2.72*** 0.14 -0.36 1.78* -0.35 0.85 -0.63 1.61       
11.64 0.24 0.93 -0.29 2.33 -0.09 4.27 -0.97   1.71 2.22** 903
Size and 
industry 
3B 
1.47 2.79*** 0.28 -0.56 1.70* -0.31 0.96 -0.35         
-3.01 -0.02 2.29 0.13 3.55 0.03 7.52 -1.43 0.05 0.87 0.98 9034A 
-0.33 -0.24 0.6 0.22 2.27** 0.09 1.48 -0.44 0.06       
-3.11 -0.02 2.30 0.13 3.55 0.03 7.54 -1.40   0.87 1.12 903
Size and prior 
performance 
4B 
-0.35 -0.23 0.61 0.21 2.28** 0.09 1.49 -0.44         
0.57 -0.01 -0.78 -0.27 1.28 0.08 -1.95 -6.59 1.39 0.30 0.34 9035A 
0.06 -0.13 -0.21 -0.45 0.84 0.25 -0.39 -2.09** 1.53       
-2.01 -0.01 -0.29 -0.37 1.17 0.09 -1.44 -5.73   0.14 0.18 903
Industry and 
prior 
performance 5B 
-0.23 -0.06 -0.08 -0.64 0.76 0.29 -0.29 -1.84*         
9.97 0.12 -0.54 -0.40 2.20 -0.23 1.84 -1.40 0.01 0.83 0.93 9036A 
1.28 1.47 -0.17 -0.78 1.66* -0.83 0.43 -0.51 0.02       
9.95 0.12 -0.54 -0.40 2.20 -0.23 1.85 -1.40   0.83 1.07 903
Size, industry 
and prior 
performance 6B 
1.3 1.48 -0.17 -0.79 1.66* -0.83 0.43 -0.52         
10.26 0.12 5.34 -1.65 4.49 -0.59 7.65   -2.11 4.07 2.5** 4217A 
0.85 0.97 1.07 -1.98** 2.15** -1.70* 1.09   -1.55       
12.59 0.12 4.21 -1.49 4.71 -0.60 7.30     3.51 2.51** 421
Size and ratio 
of book-to-
market value 7B 
1.05 0.95 0.85 -1.80* 2.26** -1.72* 1.04           
9.27 -0.01 2.95 -2.02 4.89 -0.19 2.97   0.76 2.15 1.30 4218A 
0.62 -0.03 0.47 -1.95** 1.88* -0.44 0.34   0.45       
8.43 0.00 3.36 -2.07 4.81 -0.19 3.10     2.10 1.48 421
Size and 
leverage 
8B 
0.57 -0.03 0.55 -2.03** 1.86* -0.43 0.36           
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Appendix B: Figures 
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Figure 1: How the Horizon of Holding-Period Long-Run Abnormal Returns is 
Overstated.  
The average long-term (buy-and-hold) abnormal stock returns over holding periods that extend from one to five years 
following the announcement of cash dividend reductions or omissions are calculated as:  
)1()1(),,( +∏=
−+∏
=
= mtR
b
at
b
at it
RbaiER  where  ER(i,a,b) = Excess return for firm i over  the time period from day a to 
day b, itR = the return on the common share of event firm i on day t, Rmt  is either the return on a reference portfolio 
(the CRSP equally-weighted index) or a matching firm on day t. Matching firms are selected using the same criteria as 
in table 5. The matching firms did not omit or cut their dividend during the period from five years before to five years 
after the event announcement date. The post-announcement long-term abnormal stock returns do not include the short-
term abnormal stock returns over the period [-1,0] relative to the Wall Street Journal announcement date. In separate 
analysis, the average (buy-and-hold) abnormal common stock returns for 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th year are calculated. 
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Figure 2: How the Horizon of Long-Run Abnormal Returns is Overstated When  Using 
Fama-French Calendar Portfolio Approach.  
Abnormal returns for cumulative years are  estimated for the one- to ten-year post announcement horizon for the 
sample of dividend reductions or omissions during the period 1963 to 1995. Equal weighted calendar time portfolio 
returns are calculated each month from all firms announcing  a dividend omission or reduction in the previous 12, 24, 
36, 48 or 60 months, respectively. For abnormal return for each separate year, equal weighted calendar time portfolio 
returns are calculated each month from all firms announcing  a dividend event in the previous 1 to 12, 13 to 24, 25 to 
36, 37 to 48, or  49 to 60 calendar months., respectively. 
The monthly excess returns to the calendar portfolios, R p,t  R f,t, are then regressed on the Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model in order to calculate the abnormal returns: 
R p,t  R f,t = α p + β p (R m,t  R f,t) + s p SMB t + h pLMH t + e p,t 
Where R p,t represents the return of calendar time portfolio in month t,  and R f,t is the one-month Treasury bill rate. The 
three independent variables are Fama-French three factors in each month. Market factor is the return on a value-
weighted market index minus risk free rate. Size factor is the return on a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks less 
the return on a value-weighted portfolio of big stocks. Book-to-market factor is the return on a value-weighted portfolio 
of high book-to-market stocks less the return on a  value-weighted portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. The 
intercept, α p,  , from the OLS estimation, is then interpreted as the mean monthly abnormal return of the event portfolio 
across all months in the post-announcement horizon we are interested in.  
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Figure 3A: Two-Day Average Announcement Abnormal Returns by Sub-Periods 
Two-day announcement abnormal returns are computed as the prediction error εjt in the market model:  Rjt  =  αj  +  βj 
Rmt  + εjt    where Rjt  and Rmt are respectively the continuously compounded rates of return to stock j and the equally-
weighted CRSP index over day t, and αj and βj are ordinary-least-squares (OLS) estimates. The estimation period is 
day -180 through day -31 relative to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) announcement date. 
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Figure 3B: The Average Two-Day Announcement Abnormal Returns and Average 
Percentage of Firms Paying Dividends by Sub-Periods. 
The percentage of firms paying dividends are calculated from table 1 from Baker and Wurgler (2003) as a proxy for the 
benefits of paying dividends. Two-day announcement abnormal returns are computed as the prediction error εjt in the 
market model:  Rjt  =  αj  +  βj Rmt  + εjt    where Rjt  and Rmt are respectively the continuously compounded rates of 
return to stock j and the equally-weighted CRSP index over day t, and αj and βj are ordinary-least-squares (OLS) 
estimates. The estimation period is day -180 through day -31 relative to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) announcement 
date. 
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